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Constitutional Privacy in
Psychotherapy

STEVEN R. SMITH*

I. Introduction
The recognition of a constitutional right of privacy has been a significant development in individual rights in the United States. The right
of privacy generally limits unwarranted governmental intrusion into
fundamentally important areas of people's lives and unwarranted release by or to the government of very sensitive personal information.
As acceptance of the right has grown, courts and commentators have
voiced increasing concern about the absence of protection for confidential communications between patients and psychotherapists.
Their concern has generated support for extending the constitutional
right of privacy to protect patients from state-ordered disclosure of
the confidences revealed in therapy, or, more simply, a limited constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege.1
Because the existence of a constitutional right of privacy has only
recently been recognized and has generated serious controversies in
the courts and among commentators, the scope of the right has not
yet been determined. This article suggests that the constitutional
right of privacy should include the protection of the confidential com* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Louisville School of Law;
B.A 1968, Buena Vista College; J.D. 1971, University of Iowa; MA. in Economics 1971,
University of Iowa.
1. For the purposes of this article, the term "psychotherapist-patient privilege"
includes psychologist-patient and psychiatrist-patient privileges generally, as well as
specific psychotherapist-patient privileges. See notes 14-67 infra and accompanying
text.
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munications of therapy. The article first discusses the evolution and
current status of psychotherapist-patient privileges. After proposing
a definition of the right of privacy, the article will apply that definition
to the confidences of therapy and demonstrate that the establishment of a constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege is consistent with current Supreme Court doctrine. Finally, the article will
attempt to define the scope of the proposed constitutionally-based
privilege.
Status of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
A constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege would provide considerably more protection than is now available for the confidences
revealed in therapy. Most jurisdictions in this country do not provide
for a specific psychotherapist-patient privilege. 2 Most states provide
for a physician-patient privilege, which may protect communications
between patients and psychiatrists because psychiatrists are also
physicians. 3 In these states, however, the patients of professionals in
the mental health field who are not also physicians, such as clinical
psychologists, may receive no protection. Moreover, even jurisdictions that provide for a psychotherapist-patient privilege may ex4
clude some forms of treatment from the protection of the privilege.
Extension of the federal constitutional right of privacy to protect the
confidences of therapy, of course, would effectively provide a psychotherapist-patient privilege in every jurisdiction, state as well as
federal.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly provide for a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Before adopting the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Congress rejected a set of rules proposed by the Supreme
Court ("Proposed Rules") 5 which had enumerated several specific
privileges, including a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 6 Based on
the assumption that an assurance of confidentiality is essential to effective psychotherapy,7 Rule 504 of the Proposed Rules provided testimonial confidentiality for communications between a patient and a
2. See R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 171-94 (1966); Ferster, Statutory Summary of Physician-PatientPrivileged
CommunicationLaws, in READINGS IN LAw AND PSYCHIATRY 239 (R. Allen, E. Ferster &
J. Rubin eds. 1975).
3. See Ferster, supra note 2, at 239.
4. Group therapy, for example, probably would not be covered by most privileges
because the members of the group may be considered "third parties" whose presence
destroys the privilege. See Cross, PrivilegedCommunicationsBetween Participantsin
Group Psychotherapy, 1970 L. & Soc. ORD. 191, 193-94; Meyer & Smith, A Crisis in
Group Therapy, 32 Am. PSYCHOLOGY 638, 641 (1977); Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient
TestimonialPrivilege: A PictureofMisguidedHope, 23 CATH. U. L REV. 649, 663 (1974);
Note, Group Therapy and Privileged Communications, 43 IND. L. J. 93, 99 (1967); notes
276-77 infra and accompanying text.
5. See Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973). See generally Note, CongressionalPreemption of the FederalRules of Evidence, 49 WASH. L. REV. 1184 (1974).
6. Proposed Rules of Evidence, Rule 504, reprintedin 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Rule 504].
7. Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Rule 504, reprintedin 56 F.R.D. 183, 242
(1972). The Committee stated, "A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment." Id.
(quoting Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Confidentiality and Privileged
Communications in the Practiceof Psychiatry,Rep. No. 45, at 92 (1960)).
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psychotherapist made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of a
mental or emotional condition.8 In considering Rule 504 and the
other proposed rules, however, Congress became embroiled in controversies regarding which privileges should be adopted and whether
privileges generally are a matter of substantive or procedural law.9
To avoid the difficult issues raised by these questions, Congress
chose to replace the enumerated privileges with one general rule governing all privileges.
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence now provides that the
existence of a privilege in the federal courts is "governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience .... However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege ... shall be determined in accordance with State
law."' 0 In other words, in federal courts, state law regarding privileges governs in diversity cases and federal law regarding privileges
governs in federal question cases. One purpose underlying the requirement that federal courts apply state privilege rules in diversity
cases is to protect the prerogatives of the states in establishing privileges.." Congress did allow some room for the federal courts to fashion privileges in federal nondiversity cases by providing that
common law privileges were to be applied in those cases "as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience."'1 2 Because of the ambiguity of this language,
the extent of Congress' mandate authorizing the federal courts to de13
vise appropriate privileges is unclear.
8. Proposed Rule 504, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41 (1972).
9. See 10 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 500.01, at 1 (2d ed. 1979); Friedenthal, The
Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court:A Contemporary Crisis,27 STAN. L. REV. 673,
682-85 (1975); Moore & Bendix, Congress,Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9, 2227 (1974); Schwartz, Privileges Under the FederalRules of Evidence - A Step Forward?, 38 U. Prrr. L. REV. 79, 81 (1976).
10. FED. R. EviD. 501.

11. See 10 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 501.05, at 25 (2d ed. 1979); Comment, Erie,
Privileges,and the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence: Confusion, 10 NEW ENG. I
REV. 399, 415 (1974). Ironically, by mandating that the federal courts apply different
rules of privilege depending upon the nature of the courts' jurisdiction, Rule 501 may
actually frustrate a state's purpose in providing for a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
The possibility that a patient's communications to his psychotherapist will be protected only in state court suits or in federal diversity actions, but not in federal court
suits raising federal questions, may make the patient less open in therapy and dilute
the effectiveness of the state's privilege.
12. FED. R. EvD. 501. See generally Symposium, "In the Light of Reason and Experieice'" Rule 501, 71 Nw. U. L REV. 645 (1977).
13. Some evidence suggests that Congress meant to give the federal courts considerable latitude in adopting new common law privileges in appropriate circumstances.
See notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
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I1.

ConstitutionalProtectionfor the Confidences of
Psychotherapy

Some authority is evolving for the proposition that the confidences of
psychotherapy are included within the protection of the constitutional right of privacy. A constitutionally based right of privacy may
protect the confidences revealed in therapy even if they are not protected by statute or the common law. One court has stated that the
constitutional right of privacy does not encompass a psychotherapistpatient privilege. 14 Other courts have shown an awareness of the relationship between the right of privacy and the need to protect a patient's communications to his psychotherapist, but have not resolved
the issue of a privilege on constitutional grounds. 15 A third group of
courts suggest, without expressly holding, that the Constitution may
protect the privacy of psychotherapy and of mental health information. 16 Only California, Pennsylvania, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have recognized a constitutionally
based psychotherapist-patient privilege.
ConstitutionalPsychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
California was the first jurisdiction to recognize a constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege. In In re Lifschutz, 17 one of Dr. Lifschutz's psychiatric patients filed a damage suit against the
defendant for assault, claiming severe mental and emotional distress.
When the defendant tried to take Dr. Lifschutz's deposition regarding the doctor's treatment of the patient, Dr. Lifschutz refused to answer any questions regarding the patient and refused to produce any
of the requested records.' 8 The patient neither directly consented
14. See Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 334, 307 A.2d 503, 529 (1973) (denying the
existence of a constitutional psychiatrist-patient privilege), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930
(1974); cf. Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Conn. 1970) (the right of privacy does
not extend protection to the physician-patient relationship, even when the physician is
a psychiatrist).
15. See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (noting the extraordinary sensitivity of psychotherapist-patient communications); State v. Looney,
294 N.C. 1, 28, 240 S.E.2d 612, 627 (1978) (upholding the refusal of a trial court to grant a
defense request to order a psychiatric examination of a primary prosecution witness in
part because such exams are a "drastic invasion" of the right of privacy); cf. Rennie v.
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) (because the right of privacy includes the
right to protect mental processes from governmental interference, a patient has the
right to refuse mind-altering drugs). Some courts have failed to consider the existence
of a constitutional right of privacy, but have limited discovery of medical and psychiatric files by broadly construing statutory privileges to favor a general public policy
against disclosure of psychotherapist-patient confidences. See Flora v. Hamilton, 81
F.R.D. 576, 578 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (construing a North Carolina statute that recognized a
psychiatrist-patient privilege as favoring a policy of non-disclosure).
16. Robinson v. Magovern, 83 F.R.D. 79, 91 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (acknowledging the possibility of a constitutional psychiatrist-patient privilege, the court made an exception
for highly generalized information released under a confidentiality order); Miller v.
Colonial Refrig. Transp., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 741, 747 WM.D. Pa. 1979) (conceding that there
may be a psychotherapist-patient privilege, court held that the interests of the state in
the fairness of the adversary process required a patient-litigant exception to confidentiality); United States ex reL Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1044 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(recognizing a patient-litigant exception to any constitutionally based psychiatrist-patient privilege), aft'd mem., 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977).
17. 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
18. Id. at 420, 467 P.2d at 559, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
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nor objected to the release of information about his treatment. Dr.
Lifschutz appealed a citation for contempt of court that resulted from
his refusal to produce the records. Acknowledging the sensitive nature of the confidences that patients reveal in psychotherapy, the
California Supreme Court indicated that the constitutional right of
privacy protects those communications. 19 The Lifschutz decision, in
effect, recognized a constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege.
In defining the scope of this newly recognized right, the court
sought to limit the privilege to those situations in which the protection of a patient's privacy interests was paramount. The court, for
example, rejected Dr. Lifschutz's broad formulation of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. First, Dr. Lifschutz contended that forced disclosure of any confidential communications violated his own
constitutional rights of privacy as a psychotherapist. 20 Disagreeing
with this contention, the court stated that because only the patient
reveals intimate details about his life, only the patient, not the thera21
pist, has any interest in preventing the release of that information.
Second, Dr. Lifschutz argued for an absolute psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Rejecting this broad extension of the right of privacy, the
court held that the constitutional right can be limited by the state
22
when necessary to protect or to advance a compelling state interest.
In fact, the court held that under the circumstances of the case, California had demonstrated a compelling interest sufficient to justify an
incursion into the confidences of Dr. Lifschutz's patient. California,
the court observed, required disclosure only in cases "in which the
patient's own action initiates the exposure," and, therefore, "'intrusion' into a patient's privacy remains essentially under the patient's
control."23 This exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
commonly referred to as the patient-litigant exception, provides that
when a patient brings his own mental condition into question in a
legal proceeding as an element of a claim or a defense, the patient
has waived any psychotherapist-patient privilege covering informa19. Id. at 431-32, 467 P.2d at 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839. Even though California had
enacted a psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court refused to limit its holding to
statutory grounds:
We believe that a patient's interest in keeping such confidential revelations
from public purview, in retaining this substantial privacy, has deeper roots
than the California statute and draws sustenance from our constitutional
heritage. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court declared that various guarantees [of the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy, and we believe that the confidentiality of the psychotherapeutic
session falls within one such zone.
Id. (citation omitted).
20. Id. at 423, 467 P.2d at 561, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
21. Id. at 424, 467 P.2d at 562, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 834. The court also rejected Dr. Lifschutz's claim that disclosure of the requested information would interfere with his
business and result in economic loss. Id. at 425, 467 P.2d at 563, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
22. Id. at 432, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
23. Id. at 433, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
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tion relevant to that mental or emotional condition. 24 By acknowledging the legitimacy of the state's inquiry into the communications
between Dr. Lifschutz and his patient, the court 25effectively recognized the validity of the patient-litigant exception.
The court took care to emphasize, however, that it would not sanction all inquiries into a patient's confidences under the guise of a
compelling state interest. Rather, the court held that even when the
state demonstrates a compelling interest requiring disclosure of the
confidences of therapy, it must limit its inquiry into the confidential
information as narrowly as possible to avoid unnecessary invasions
of privacy. 26 In the context of the patient-litigant exception, for instance, the state may conduct only a "limited inquiry into the confidences of the psychotherapist-patient relationship. '2 7 Specifically,
the court permitted the trial judge to compel disclosure only of those
psychotherapist-patient confidences directly related to the conditions the patient himself had disclosed or brought into controversy. 28
As further protection against unwarranted intrusions into the patient's privacy, the Lifschutz court advised trial courts to issue protective orders to limit inquiries into confidential matters,2 9 to use
their powers to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice to the patient, 30
and to convene ex parte proceedings to determine the materiality of
requested confidential evidence. 3 1 The court also indicated that trial
courts might protect the patient's privacy by limiting, when possible,
a
the therapist's testimony to conclusions, rather than permitting
32
description of the intimate factual details of the patient's life.
24. Id. at 422-23, 467 P.2d at 561, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 833. The California psychotherapist-patient privilege statute in effect when Lifschutz was decided provided for a patient-litigant exception. Id. at 433 n.15, 467 P.2d at 568 n.15, 85 CaL Rptr. at 840 n.15
(citing CAL.EvD. CODE § 996 (Deering 1966)).
25. 2 Cal. 3d at 433, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840. The reason for the court's
acceptance of California's claim that its interest outweighed that of Dr. Lifschutz's patient is not entirely clear. Apparently, the court permitted a limited inquiry into the
communications between Lifschutz and his patient by combining the patient's implicit
waiver of his privacy in bringing his mental and emotional condition into question with
the "compelling interest" of the state in obtaining all relevant evidence at trial. Id. at
433-34, 467 P.2d at 568-69, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41. Arguably, the court required the presence of both these factors to justify the inquiry. If Dr. Lifschutz's patient had not
brought his own mental condition into issue, the California court probably would not
have required the psychotherapist to reveal any of his patient's confidences. In other
words, whether the state's interest in acquiring all relevant evidence would have been
sufficient to allow the invasion of privacy is doubtful. Nevertheless some state interests, such as preventing imminent serious physical harm to its citizens, are so significant that they alone would justify requiring a breach of the confidentiality of
therapists. See notes 285-305 infra and accompanying text.
26. 2 Cal. 3d at 437-38, 467 P.2d at 572, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
27. Id. at 431, 467 P.2d at 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
28. Id. at 435, 467 P.2d at 570, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
29. Id. at 437, 467 P.2d at 572, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 844; see CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE
§ 2019(b) (1) (Deering 1973) (granting the court discretion to "make any.., order
which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression").
30. 2 Cal. 3d at 437, 467 P.2d at 572, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 884. See CAI. EVID.CODE § 352
(Deering 1966).
31. Id. at 437 n. 23, 467 P.2d at 571 n.23, 85 Cal.Rptr. at 843 n.23. The court noted that
these protective measures were provided for by the Code of Civil Procedure and rules
of evidence of California. Id. (quoting CAL. Evm. CODE § 915(b) (Deering 1966)).
32. 2 Cal. 3d at 438 n.25, 467 P.2d at 572 n.25, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 844 n.25. The court
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The constitutional protection for psychotherapist-patient communications recognized in Lifschutz has been ratified in a series of California decisions since 1970. 3 But the California Supreme Court has
also narrowed the scope of the privilege to accommodate what it perceived to be the state's legitimate concerns. In Tarasoffv. Regents of
the University of California,34 the court recognized an additional
"compelling interest" justifying the state's breach of psychotherapist-patient confidentiality: the protection of human life. The court
held that a psychotherapist has a duty to take affirmative steps, including disclosure of patient confidences, to protect potential victims
from attack when he determines that his patient presents a serious
danger of violence.3 5 The Tarasoff decision is of additional significance because it presented a clear conflict between the privacy interests of a patient and a significant interest of the state; unlike the
situation in Lifschutz, the patient's conduct in no way manifested an
intent to waive his privilege. Consequently, Tarasoff endorses the
proposition that the psychotherapist-patient privilege must yield to
regardless of the patient's willingcertain compelling state interests,
36
ness to waive the privilege.
Evincing a similar sensitivity to the confidentiality of psychotherapy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also
held that the constitutional right of privacy protects the confidentiality of psychotherapist-patient communications. In Caesarv. Mountanos,3 7 a case factually similar to Lifschutz, Dr. Caesar refused to
answer questions about one of his patients and was held in contempt
of the California state court.38 The patient had filed suit against third
parties alleging that two separate automobile accidents had caused
her "pain and suffering not limited to her physical ailments."3 9 Refusing to discuss the treatment even after the patient specifically
waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 4° Dr. Caesar claimed
stated: "Necessary information will often be accessible without delving deeply into
specific intimate factual circumstances and such searching probes ought to be avoided
whenever possible. The psychotherapist's general conclusions about specific emotional symptoms will often suffice to convey the needed information while preserving
the patient's dignity and interest in privacy." Id.
33. See, e.g., Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330, 337, 508 P.2d 309, 313, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 309, 313 (1973); People v. Hopkins, 44 Cal. App. 3d 669, 674, 119 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64

(1975).
34. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (vacating Tarasoff v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 CaL Rptr. 129 (1974)).
35. 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
36. Although few would dispute the court's conclusion that the state has a compelling interest in preventing unnecessary deaths, whether Tarasoff advances that interest is subject to considerable disagreement. See notes 285-90 infra and accompanying
text.
37. 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
38. 542 F.2d at 1065.

39. Id..
40. Id. at 1066. The patient later officially revoked her waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id. In several decisions, the party opposing disclosure has con-
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that the Supreme Court's broad extension of constitutional protection to physician-patient privacy in Roe v. Wade 41 and Doe v. Bolton 42
implied that in the context of psychotherapy, the right of privacy was
absolute. 43 Although the Ninth Circuit agreed that confidentiality is
essential to psychotherapy" and that the very nature of the communications brings them within the constitutional right of privacy
through a constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege, 45 it rejected the argument that the privilege was absolute. Instead, the
court held that the privilege may be limited when necessary to advance a compelling state interest.4 6 The court next proceeded to
evaluate the state interest in obtaining disclosure and found that an
invasion of the confidences of Dr. Caesar's patient was justified.4 7 In
reaching this conclusion, however, the court failed to identify precisely the state interest that would be furthered by disclosure. At
one point the court asserted that the "state has a compelling interest
to insure that truth is ascertained in legal proceedings in its courts of
law." 48 The court also focused on the implied waiver of the privilege
49
by Dr. Caesar's patient in bringing her mental condition into issue.
Apparently, the state's interest in obtaining all material evidence,
coupled with the implicit waiver by the patient, provided the neces50
sary basis for the Ninth Circuit's holding in Caesar.
tended that the psychotherapist, instead of the patient, should decide whether to
waive the privilege or that both the patient and the psychotherapist should have the
right to prevent waiver of the privilege. See, e.g., In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 423 & n.4,
467 P.2d at 561-62 & n.4, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34 & n.4. Two justifications for this proposal
are cited: (1) requiring the psychotherapist to disclose confidential matters relating to
his patients unconstitutionally impairs the practice of his profession; (2) the psychotherapist has a privacy interest in the therapy he has conducted. See id. at 423-27, 467
P.2d at 561-64, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 833-36. Rejecting these contentions, the court in Lifschutz held that only the patient has the right to prohibit or to authorize disclosure of
confidences revealed during psychotherapy. Id.; see note 21 supra and accompanying
text.
41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
43. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d at 1066, 1067.
44. Id. at 1067. According to the court, '"psychotherapy is perhaps more dependent
on absolute confidentiality than other medical disciplines". Id.
45. Id. at 1067 n.9. The court stated, "We agree, as did the court in Lifschutz, that
the right of privacy encompassing the doctor-patient relationship identified and explained in Griswold, Roe, and Doe goes beyond the factual context of those cases, i.e.,
intimate marital and sexual problems, and extends to psychotherapist-patient communications." Id.
46. Id. at 1067-68. The court observed, "We have no doubt that the right of privacy
relied on by Dr. Caesar is substantial. However, the right is conditional rather than
absolute and limited impairment of that right may be allowed if properly justified." Id.
at 1068.
47. Id. at 1069, 1070.
48. Id. at 1069. In support of this assertion, the court cited Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Obviously, the state's desire for all relevant testimony by
itself cannot be the basis for overcoming a constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege. The very purpose of the privilege is to keep certain kinds of information from
courts, even though the information may be relevant. An exception to the privilege
that permitted inquiries into patient confidences merely to obtain relevant testimony
for trial would eviscerate the privilege.
49. 542 F.2d at 1066. The Caesar court's reliance on an implied waiver theory is
similar to the approach adopted by the California Supreme Court in In re Lifschutz.
See note 25 supra.
50. The basis for overcoming the constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege
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Judge Hufstedler, concurring and dissenting, believed that both the
majority in Caesar and the California court in Lifshutz had failed adequately to define the compelling state interest and to limit the inquiry under the patient-litigant exception. She argued that
communications between patient and psychotherapist were
"squarely within the constitutional right of privacy"5 1 and therefore
any infringement of the right, even if based in part on an implicit
waiver by the patient-litigant, should be strictly limited.52 She asserted, moreover, that the state's general interest in ascertaining all
relevant evidence would not alone be sufficient to compel disclosure
of patient confidences. 53 Criticizing the majority for according this
general interest too much weight, Judge Hufstedler sought to identify
precisely the competing interests of the state and the patient-litigant,
and to balance these interests in a manner that would maximize protection of the patient's privacy.5 4 A party invoking the patient-litigant exception in civil litigation, she proposed, should in general be
limited to ascertaining the time, length, cost, and ultimate diagnosis
of the treatment.5 5 Under the exception, an adverse party should be
permitted to demand additional information concerning treatment
and related confidential communications only if that party demonstrates a compelling need for this evidence. 56 Demonstrating a
strong desire to protect the patient's right of privacy, Judge Hufstedler's consideration of the ways to prevent the patient-litigant exception from becoming an excuse for broad fishing expeditions into
in Caesarwas somewhat difficult to determine in part because at one point the patient
had explicitly waived the privilege. See note 40 supra.
51. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d at 1071 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and

dissenting).

52. Id. at 1072 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Hufstedler ar-

gued, 'This sensitive zone of privacy [psychotherapist-patient communications] is
protected as a fundamental constitutional right. Although the right is not absolute, it
enters the combat zone heavily armed. It will yield only to a compelling state interest,
and then will give ground only to the extent necessary to protect a compelling adverse
interest." Id. (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 1073 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).

54. Id. Judge Hufstedler asserted.
The contest is not simply between the state's interest in facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings and the patient's
interest in protecting his privacy. If it were, the patient's interest in his privacy would easily prevail over the state's general interest in the production
of relevant evidence in a routine personal injury case. The public and private interests that are involved are more complex. The state is interested in
effective access to the courts and in fair trials with respect to both plaintiffs
and defendants in civil litigation. On the patient-plaintiff's side, the state

also has interests in the deterrent effect of civil litigation upon the potential
tort-feasors, in the health of its citizens, and in the protection of privacy of
its citizens.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally S. HUFSTEDLER, THE DIRECTIONS AND MIsDIRECTIONS OF A CONsTrrunoNAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY (1971), reprinted in 26 THE RECORD 546
(1971).
55. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d at 1074-75 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and
dissenting).
56. Id.
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an adverse party's mental and emotional problems 57 is the most thorough and specific analysis found in the psychotherapy privacy cases.
In In re B, 5 8 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, without a majority
opinion, also recognized a constitutionally based psychotherapist-patient privilege. 59 Unlike the patients in Caesar and Lifschutz, the patient in In re B was not a party to the lawsuit for which her records
were sought. Rather, the case involved a juvenile delinquency proceeding concerning "B." During the course of the predisposition investigation, juvenile court personnel discovered that B's mother had
received psychiatric treatment at the Western Psychiatric Institute
and Clinic of the University of Pittsburgh. Dr. Roth, acting for the
director of the clinic, was ordered by the juvenile court to turn over
the mother's psychiatric records. Without consent of the mother, Dr.
Roth refused to do so and was cited for contempt of the juvenile
court. Although it ruled that the state's statutory doctor-patient privilege did not apply to the disputed records, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed the contempt citation on the ground that
the constitutional right of privacy protected the information from involuntary disclosure. 60 Noting that psychotherapy requires patients
to reveal the most intimate details of their lives, 61 the court concluded that the constitutional right of privacy includes protection of
the confidences revealed in therapy.62 The court conceded that recognition of constitutional protection for the confidences of therapy
might hamper the efforts of juvenile courts to obtain necessary information, but emphasized that the right of privacy must prevail over
63
the interest of the court in obtaining the privileged information.
The court also noted that the state's interest in securing access to a
patient's files in such cases was diminished because, as a practical
matter, courts could obtain most of the desired information from
sources other than the psychotherapist. 64
57. Slovenko has noted that judicial failure to curtail fishing expeditions into an
adverse party's emotional conditions is a major threat to the confidentiality of therapy
even in jurisdictions that provide for a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Slovenko,
Psychotherapist-PatientTestimonialPrivilege: A Pictureof Misguided Hope, 23 CATH.
U. L. REv. 649, 654-61 (1974).
58. 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978).
59. Id. at 484, 394 A.2d at 425. The court was badly divided. Justices Eagen, Nix,
and Pomeroy dissented. Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion, and Justice
O'Brien concurred in the result.
60. In re B, 482 Pa. at 477-84, 394 A.2d at 422-26. Justice Roberts, concurring, believed that the statutory privilege covered the mother's records. Consequently, he argued that consideration of the constitutional question was unnecessary. Id. at 486-91,
394 A-2d at 426-30 (Roberts, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 485, 394 A.2d at 425-26.
62. Id. at 484, 394 A.2d at 425. The plurality opinion stated:
We conclude that in Pennsylvania, an individual's interest in preventing the
disclosure of information revealed in the context of a psychotherapist-patient relationship has deeper roots than the Pennsylvania doctor-patient
privilege statute, and that the patient's right to prevent disclosure of such
information is constitutionally based. This constitutional foundation emanates from the penumbras of the various guarantees of the Bill of Rights as
well as from the guarantees of the Constitution of this Commonwealth ....
Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 486, 394 A.2d at 426.
64. Id. The court suggested, for example, that the mother could have been ex-
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The strength of the protection afforded psychotherapist-patient
communications in In re B is demonstrated by the refusal of the
court to require disclosure of the information even though the countervailing state interest was quite substantial. The state sought access to a patient's psychiatric files in the disposition phase of a
juvenile delinquency proceeding.65 The importance of juvenile proceedings, in general, and the quasi-criminal nature of delinquency
proceedings, in particular, increased the state's interest in obtaining
all relevant information. 6 6 Furthermore, because the information
concerning the mother's therapy would have been used only in a disposition report in a juvenile proceeding, the court could have assured
the confidentiality of the material by sealing the patient's records and
by not disclosing the information at a public hearing. Despite the
state's significant interest and the means available to limit disclosure, the court rejected the state's request because of the possibility
that even a limited breach of the confidentiality of psychotherapistpatient communications could involve a significant invasion of privacy.67 The decision thus represents a vigorous endorsement of the
privacy of communications between patient and psychotherapist.
Cases Not Involving Privileges
Other courts recently have extended some protection to confidential
psychological information without recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege. These courts have held that the constitutional right of
privacy protects information concerning an individual's mental and
amined by a court-appointed psychiatrist to determine her ability to care for her child.

Id.
65. Id. at 485-86, 394 A.2d at 420-21.
66. See Atwood v. Atwood, 550 S.W.2d 465, 466-67 (Ky. 1976). The Atwood court
stated, "A custody action is a civil proceeding of momentous importance. It not only
affects the parents, but drastically affects the lives of the children." Id. at 466. The
importance of juvenile proceedings led the Atwood court to interpret a statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege narrowly, to permit access to the psychiatric records of the
juvenile's father. Id.
67. See 482 Pa. at 484-85, 394 A.2d at 425-26. In addition to the psychotherapistpatient relationship, several other types of confidential relationships may be subject to
constitutional protection. For example, claims that the constitutional right of privacy
protects parent-child communications have received judicial approval. See In re Application of A & M, 61 App. Div. 2d 426, 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1978); People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 716-17, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (Westchester County Ct. 1979); Note,
Fromthe Mouths ofBabes: Does the ConstitutionalRight of PrivacyMandate a ParentChild Privilege?,1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1002, 1029. Contra,In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d
745,749, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913,914 (1976). One student commentator has suggested that the
attorney-client privilege also is constitutionally mandated. Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing and ConstitutionalEntitlement, 91 HIIv. I REV.
464, 485-86 (1977).
Interestingly, another scholar has suggested that the priest-penitent privilege as typically applied is constitutionally prohibited. See Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-PenitentPrivilege- The Application of the Religion Clauses, 29
U. Prir. L. REV. 27, 63 (1967).
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emotional states and attitudes, and have acknowledged the obligation of the state to avoid releasing such information to the public.
In Hawaii PsychiatricSociety v. Ariyoshi,68 a federal district court
enjoined the state of Hawaii from enforcing a statute that permitted
the issuance of "administrative inspection warrants" to review the
medical (mental health) records of Medicaid patients. 69 The court
held that "an individual's decisions whether to seek the aid of a psychiatrist, and whether or not to communicate certain personal information to that psychiatrist, fall squarely within" the constitutional
right of privacy.7 0 Characterizing the significance of the privacy interest threatened by the statute, the court stated, "[N] o area could be
more deserving of protection than communications between a psyIn the court's opinion, the Hawaii
chiatrist and his patient."'
scheme for inspecting psychiatric records would interfere with therapy by destroying a patient's willingness to disclose intimate personal matters.7 2 Although the statute provided that patient
information gathered from a psychiatrist's files was to remain confidential, 73 the court found that given the extremely sensitive nature of
the information, its disclosure, even to state officials, would invade
the patient's privacy.7 4 Balanced against the patient's interest in privacy was the state's interest in protecting the Medicaid program from
fraud, which the court accepted as compelling.75 Nevertheless, the
court held that the state had not shown that the issuance of warrants
to inspect the confidential medical records of a psychiatrist was nec76
essary to advance this compelling interest.
Merriken v. Cressman,77 another federal district court decision expanding constitutional protection for psychological information, involved a junior high school program designed to identify emotionally
handicapped students and provide "early intervention" to prevent
drug abuse.7 8 As part of the program, students were expected to
complete a questionnaire dealing with matters of a personal nature
and soliciting information regarding their emotional states.7 9 The
68. 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979).
69. Id. at 1052.
70. Id. at 1038.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1039.
73. Id. at 1040. The record, however, did not reflect whether Hawaii had fully developed a scheme to ensure the confidentiality of the information once the state received it. The court noted that the existence of a scheme to prevent public disclosure
of medical information was considered significant by the Supreme Court in Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-603 (1977), which upheld a state prescription drug reporting act.

481 F. Supp. at 1040.
74. 481 F. Supp. at 1041.
75. Id.
76. Id. The court was doubtful that Hawaii could prove that inspection of patient
files was necessary to advance the compelling state interest in minimizing fraud. Id.
But cf. Gabor v. Hyland, 166 N.J. Super. 275, 399 A.2d 993, 994-95 (App. Div. 1979) (permitting the state to review medical files when prosecuting a psychiatrist for Medicaid
fraud if the patients agreed to waive confidentiality).
77. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
78. Id. at 914, 916.
79. Id. at 918. The questionnaire focused, in part, on family relationships and early
childhood. It asked, for example, whether the student's family is "very close, somewhat close, not too close, or not close at all." The student was also asked to reveal
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purpose of the questionnaire was apparently to identify those students with an emotional propensity toward drug abuse. 80 Noting the
Supreme Court's frequent recognition of the importance of and need
for careful protection of the right of privacy, 81 and the inherently personal nature of the questions asked and the relationship between
parent and child, 82 the court held that the program was unconstitutional. 83 It acknowledged the state's apparent interest in correcting
drug abuse, but doubted whether the program would serve this objective. 84 The court also mentioned that despite claims of the state to
the contrary, the subpoena power of the state presented a threat to
85
the confidentiality of the information collected about the students.
This threat, combined with the questionable efficacy of the program
in combatting drug abuse, persuaded the court to issue an injunction
efforts to collect sensitive psychoprohibiting the state from further
86
logical and emotional data.
The court in Lora v. Board of Education8 7 also found that the constitutional right of privacy protects records containing psychological
information.8 8 In a suit against the New York school board alleging
the discriminatory evaluation and placement of handicapped children, plaintiffs moved to compel production of the diagnostic and
referral files of fifty students. Because they contained sensitive psychological information, plaintiffs requested that the fies be randomly
selected and that all names and identifying data be removed. 89 The
court noted the importance of privacy in protecting information a patient reveals to a psychotherapist. 90 In granting the plaintiffs' motion,
intimate behavior of and feelings expressed by his parents, such as whether they
"hugged and kissed him good-night when he was small"; whether they told him how
much they loved him or her"; whether the parents "seemed to know the student's
needs or wants"; and whether the student "feels that he is loved by his parents." Id.

80. Id. at 915.
81. Id. The court stated: "[T]he right to privacy is on an equal or possibly more
elevated pedestal than some other individual Constitutional rights and should be
treated with as much deference as free speech." Id. at 918.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 922.
84. Id. at 921.
85. Id. at 916. The court stated:
Even if those who are to be working with the CPI Program were to try and
be as confidential as possible,. . . there is absolutely no assurance that the
materials which have been gathered would be free from access from outside
authorities in the community who have subpoena power. Thus, there is no
assurance that should an enterprising district attorney convene a special
grand jury to investigate the drug problem in Montgomery County, the
records of the CPI Program would remain inviolate from subpoenas and
that they could not determine the identity of children who have been labeled by the CPI Program as potential drug abusers.
Id.
86. Id. at 922.
87. 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
88. Id. at 570.
89. Id. at 568.
90. Id. at 569-74.
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however, the court relied primarily on this scheme to ensure anonymity, as well as its own ability to fashion protective orders covering the use of the diagnostic files. 9' Both of these safeguards
convinced the court that granting the motion would cause at most
only a minimal invasion of the privacy of those students whose files
were released. 92 In effect, there was no real invasion of privacy because the information would not be released in a personally identifiable form. The court cautioned, however, that the anonymous
intrusion into the psychological fies was justifiable only because the
plaintiffs demonstrated a genuine need for the information and be93
cause the data was unavailable from any other source.
Applicants for positions as firefighters in Jersey City objected in
McKenna v. Fargo94 to the city's insistence that they undergo psychological testing as a prerequisite to being hired, and to the city's
maintenence of the psychological profiles after it had made its hiring
decisions. 95 The court acknowledged that the constitutional right of
privacy limits the ability of the state to collect and to maintain certain kinds of very personal information concerning emotional and
mental conditions, 9 6 including the kind of information elicited
through psychological testing.97 Nevertheless, the court upheld the
psychological testing of the applicants because of the state's overriding interest in ensuring the selection of firefighters who would be
emotionally stable under stress. 98 Firefighting is inherently dangerous and pressured, the court observed; consequently, firefighters
must possess certain psychological traits to ensure the safety not
only of the community, but also of the other firefighters. 99 Because of
the life-endangering nature of firefighting, the court characterized the
state interest in psychologically screening applicants as "of the highest order"' 0 0 and "of an importance that would be found in very few
occupations."'' 1 The constitutionality of the psychological testing,
91. Id. at 574, 582-83. The court noted that it could use any of the following means
to further safeguard individual privacy: (1) order that the information obtained be
used only for the purpose of the pending litigation; (2) require strict confidentiality
enforceable by the penalty of contempt; (3) limit the number of copies available; (4)
order that the files submitted to the court be sealed; and (5) require that all materials
be returned immediately after the conclusion of the suit. Id. at 582-83.
92. Id. at 583.
93. Id. at 584. The court explained that although "the impact of disclosure on the
state and personal interests implicated is legally insignificant, even such minimal intrusion might be sufficient ground for denying discovery if plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate a genuine need for the material, or that the information sought is unavailable from an alternative source." Id.
94. 451 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.J. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979).
95. 451 F. Supp. at 1381.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1380-81. Because only those who voluntarily applied for firefighting positions underwent psychological testing, potential applicants ultimately controlled
whether they would be tested or not. This kind of "implicit waiver" is closely analogous to the patient-litigant exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege recognized in the Lifschutz and Caesardecisions. See notes 13-57 supra and accompanying
text.
98. 451 F. Supp. at 1381.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1377. The interest of the state in preventing unnecessary injuries and
deaths caused by emotionally unstable firefighters is similar to the state interest rec[VOL.
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however, was conditioned on the city's development of formal plans
and regulations to preserve the confidentiality of the information obtained during the testing. 0 2 The court further suggested that the city
limit access to the information to the psychologist reviewing the applicant and to city employees who had specific reason to use the
data.10 3 As final precautions, the court recommended that the city
retain the records only for a specified period of time and that it establish a system for destroying those records that were not necessary to
serve the compelling state interest.104
The foregoing cases suggest that in a variety of circumstances
courts have recognized that the constitutional right of privacy prohibits the state from publicly disclosing sensitive information concerning the mental and emotional condition of individuals. The principle
that the confidences of therapy and other sensitive mental health information are protected by the constitutional right of privacy, however, has only recently begun to win judicial acceptance. 10 5 The
viability of this principle, therefore, is dependent upon the continued
development and application of the constitutional right of privacy.
III.

The ConstitutionalRight of Privacy and the

Confidences of Therapy
The constitutional right of privacy had its genesis in decisions during
the past century in which the federal courts invoked several provisions of the Bill of Rights to protect personal privacy. These earlier
decisions relied on specific rights of the Constitution - particularly
the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment - to imognized by the California courts in preventing unnecessary injuries and deaths caused
by the actions of dangerous mental patients. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17
Cal. 3d 425, 442, 551 P.2d 334, 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976).
Despite the court's characterization of the city's interest as compelling, the danger

presented by an unstable firefighter, as a practical matter, is unclear. The city produced evidence that in several instances firefighters refused orders or dropped fire
hoses and fled from fires, 451 F. Supp. at 1361 n.8, 1367, but apparently offered no evidence concerning the extent to which these or similar incidents anywhere in the country had caused serious injury or death to any fire-fighter or member of the community.
Although a firefighter who panicked undoubtedly would create some danger, the court

should have demanded substantial evidence about the extent of the danger before it
classified the city's interest as "of the highest order." Similarly, the court should have
required the city to demonstrate the ability of city psychologists to predict which applicants would panic under pressure. By perfunctorily accepting the city's assertions,

the court neglected its duty to safeguard fundamental constitutional rights from undue
governmental encroachment.
102. McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. at 1382.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See notes 17-67 supra and accompanying text. Other cases suggest, but do not
explicitly hold, that the constitutional right of privacy may protect the confidences of
therapy. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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10 6
plement a general concept of privacy, or the "right to be let alone.'
The notion of a distinct right of privacy first received general recognition in an article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. (later Justice)
Brandeis. 0 7 The article, however, only facilitated judicial acceptance
of civil tort actions to protect privacy; 0 8 it did not lead directly to the
establishment of a separate constitutional right of privacy. 0 9

Not until 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut" ° did the Supreme Court
recognize a specific constitutional right of privacy."' Striking down a
Connecticut statute that prohibited married couples from using con106. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis argued:
The makers of our Consitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion
by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 478; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
107. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Hnv. L. REV. 193 (1890). The article was apparently induced by Mr. Warren's distress over the editorial treatment of his
family's social activities in the Boston newspapers. In a letter to Warren, Brandeis
recounted that it was "a suggestion of yours [Warren's], as well as your deepseated
abhorrence of the invasions of social privacy, which led to our taking up the inquiry,"
to which Warren later added the notation, "You are right of course about the genesis of
the article." Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Samuel D. Warren (April 8, 1905) with
note added by Warren (April 10, 1905) (copy on file in the University of Louisville Law
Library).
108. The invasions of privacy cognizable in tort were the public disclosure of private
facts, the intrusion upon physical seclusion or solitude, the placement of another in a
false light in the public eye, and the appropriation of another's name or likeness for
profit. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 802-803 (4th ed. 1971); Henkin, Privacyand
Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1420 (1974).
109. The historical development of the right of privacy is well documented. See generally Clark, ConstitutionalSources of the Right of Privacy, 19 VMn L. REV. 833 (1974);
Emerson, Nine Justicesin Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 219 (1965); Griswold,
The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 216 (1960); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLuM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); O'Connor, Right to Privacy in HistoricalPerspective, 53 MAss. L.Q. 101 (1968); Heyman & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v.
Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1973); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and
ConstitutionallyProtectedPrivacy Under the Fourthand Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv.
L. REV. 945 (1977); Note, Toward a Right of Privacyas a Matter of State Constitutional
Law, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 633 (1977); Comment, Roe v. Wade and In re Quinlan: Individual Decisions and the Scope of Privacy's Constitutional Guarantee, 12 U.S.F. L.
REv. 111 (1977); cf. Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Processof Life
and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1977) (describing the development of the new substantive due process).
110. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
111. Id. at 485. In fashioning this new right, the court drew upon aspects of earlier
decisions. The right of privacy in making fundamental personal decisions, such as
whether to use contraceptives, had been anticipated in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 537-38 (1942). Similarly, the right of privacy in controlling family relationships and
child rearing had been evolving in several earlier cases. See Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944) (state statute prohibiting minors from selling merchandise in
public places overrides a parent's claim of authority in her own household); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the right to make certain
decisions regarding the education of one's children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401 (1923) (state law prohibiting the instruction of elementary school children in a foreign language unconstitutionally interferes with the power of parents to control their
children's education). The Court has subsequently acknowledged the privacy aspects
of all these decisions. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977).
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traceptives, the Court enumerated several reasons compelling recognition of a constitutional right of privacy in the context of the case:
the historical importance of marriage, 1 2 the intimate nature of the
relationship between husband and wife," 3 the private nature of the
relationship between the couple and their physician," 4 and the belief
that governmental intrusion into the marital bedroom is inappropriate.115 The Justices could not agree, however, whether the right emanated from the penumbras of several constitutional guarantees," 6 or
was specifically derived from the ninth 1 7 or fourteenth
amendments." 8
The Court again recognized a constitutional right of privacy in Eisenstadt v. Baird," 9 in which it reversed the defendant's conviction
for distributing contraceptives to an unmarried person. 120 Although
the Court based its decision primarily on the defendant's equal protection claim that the state impermissibly distinguished between
married and single persons,'12 1 it also relied significantly on the right
of privacy. 22 As in the Griswold decision, however, the Court again
failed to identify the specific constitutional basis of the right. Noting
that its decision in Griswold recognized the right of privacy only in
the marital relationship, the Court extended the right to other individuals and relationships: "[If] the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
123
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."'
In other words, the court viewed the right of privacy as the right of
112. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 486.
113. Id. at 482.
114. Id..
115. Id. at 485-86.
116. The opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, suggested that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance .... Various guarantees create zones of privacy.... The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id. at
484-85 (citations omitted).
117. Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice Goldberg, while joining the
opinion of the Court, emphasized the importance of the Ninth Amendment: 'To hold
that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of
privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many
words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever." Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
118. Justice Harlan and Justice White relied upon the fourteenth amendment to
strike down the Connecticut law. Id. at 499, 502 (White, J., concurring). Justice Harlan
stated that the proper question was "whether this Connecticut statute infringes the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates
basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
119. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
120. Id. at 443.
121. Id. at 447.
122. Id. at 453.
123. Id. at 453.
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individuals to make certain "fundamental decisions," such as those
regarding procreation, free from governmental compulsion.
In Roe v. Wade, 2 4 the Court struck down criminal abortion laws,
which proscribed abortions except for the purpose of saving the life
of the mother, because the laws interfered with a woman's right of
privacy. 125 Though conceding that the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, 26 the Court traced the general concept of personal privacy, or zones of privacy, to its 1891 decision in
PacificRailroadCo. v. Botsford 12 7 and examined at length the line of
decisions that subsequently contributed to the establishment of the
right of privacy. 28 Unlike previous decisions, however, Roe clearly
tied the right of privacy to the fourteenth amendment's "concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action.' 29 Adopting a
"fundamental right" standard for determining when privacy is constitutionally protected, the Court stated in language derived from fourteenth amendment cases that "only personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'
are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.' 130 The Court
...
qualified this standard, however, and held that, as with other funda124. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
125. Id. at 164.
126. Id. at 152.
127. 141 U.S. 250 (1891) (a court of the United States cannot order a plaintiff in a
personal injury action to submit to a physical exam in advance of the trial).
128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53. Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at
least the roots of that right of privacy in the First Amendment, Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. [479], 484-485 [ (1965) ]; in the Ninth
Amendment, id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). These decisions make it clear
that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it
clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. [438],
453-454 [(1972)]; id. at 460, 463-65 (White, J., concurring in result); family
relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child
rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, supra. Id. (parallel citations omitted).
129. 410 U.S. at 153. Contending that the specific constitutional basis for the right of
privacy was not determinative of the petitioners' entitlement to protection, the Court
stated: 'This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy." Id.
130. Id. at 152. Although he agreed that the state laws were constitutionally infirm,
Justice Stewart rejected the concept of a constitutionally protected right of privacy.
Id. at 167 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring). Crediting Griswold for influencing his views,
he premised his decision on the concept of "liberty" protected by the due process
clause. Id. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, also criticized the
majority's acceptance of a constitutional right of privacy. 410 U.S. at 171-78 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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mental rights, the right of privacy is not absolute and may be limited
by the state through narrowly drawn laws designed to protect a
"compelling state interest."1 31 On this basis, the Court distinguished
Griswold and Eisenstadt,which concerned marital intimacy and the
right to use contraceptives, from Roe, which concerned the right to an
abortion, by holding that the state, at some point, has a compelling
interest in the life of the developing fetus. 3 2 At that point, the Court
continued, "[t] he woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of
33
privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly."
Despite the Supreme Court's acceptance of a constitutional right of
privacy, the nature and scope of that right remains unclear. In early
privacy decisions, not only the nature of the right, but also its constitutional basis were indefinite; not until Roe did any constitutional
theory for the right of privacy command a majority of the Court.
Even though Roe removed doubts as to the textual basis for the right
of privacy, the scope of the right nonetheless has remained uncertain.
A recent case, moreover, has further confused, rather than clarified,
34
the proper scope of the right. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,'
which upheld without opinion a sodomy statute applied to homosexual conduct,1 3 5 has been particularly difficult for legal scholars to fit
within the framework of constitutional privacy. 36 Because it sanctioned state interference with a privacy interest of a most intimate
nature - an individual's sexual orientation 13 7 - the decision created
concern for the continued viability of the right of privacy. 3 8 Doe,
however, must be read in light of other post-Roe decisions, particularly those relating to procreation and home and family life, which
have reaffirmed the right of privacy. 3 9 These decisions indicate that
when raised in a different context than Doe, the right of privacy may
provide extensive protection against unwarranted state intrusion
131. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155-56 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 460, 46364 (1952) (White, J., concurring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 307-308 (1940)).
132. 410 U.S. at 159.
133. Id.
134. 425 U.S. 901, rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976) (reported below at 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975)).
135. 403 F. Supp. at 1203.
136. See Perry, Substantive Due ProcessRevisited: Reflections on (andBeyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 417, 436-51 (1976); Wilkinson & White, ConstitutionalProtectionfor PersonalLifestyles, 62 CORNE.L L. REV. 563, 591-600 (1977). See generally
Comment, Constitutional Protection of Private Sexual Conduct Among Consenting
Adults: Another Look at Sodomy Statutes,62 IowA L. REV. 568 (1976); Comment, Doe v.
Commonwealth'sAttorney: A Set-Back for the Right of Privacy,65 Ky. L. J. 748 (1977).
137. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975).
138. Some scholars have suggested that the constitutional right of privacy as an
independent constitutional right is no longer viable. See, e.g., Silver, The Future of
ConstitutionalPrivacy, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 211, 215-29, 253-55, 273-80 (1977).
139. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1975);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40, 648 (1974).
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into areas of personal concern. The right is limited, however, by the
compelling state interest doctrine. Because states may limit the right
of privacy, as well as other constitutional rights, when necessary to
protect a compelling state interest, the protection afforded by the priwillingness to clasvacy right will vary depending upon the Court's
14°
sify particular state interests as compelling.
Although the nature and scope of the right remain somewhat
vague, the right of privacy has become part of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. In other words, the right of privacy
acquires a constitutional dimension when protection of the privacy
interest involved is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 41
These constitutional privacy interests have been defined in a variety
of ways, 4 2 and divided into a number of categories. 143 In addition to
the privacy interests specifically protected by particular provisions of
the Constitution - for example, the search and seizure provision of
140. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1977) (state statute requiring pharmacists to furnish prescription information about certain dangerous, though legitimate, drugs was a valid exercise of state police power); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-82 (1976) (Court upheld the right of the state to require a
woman to give written consent to an abortion, but struck down the requirement of
spousal or parental consent when either party could veto the woman's decision).
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972) (newsman does not have a first amendment privilege to refuse to testify and answer questions before a grand jury). For a
more complete examination of Whalen, Planned Parenthood, and Branzburg, see
notes 225-52 and accompanying text. See also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425 (1977) (former President's expectation of privacy in personal communications was overcome by an "important public interest" when the invasion of privacy
was very limited).
141. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Roe and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), a
companion case, suggested that the Constitution protects three kinds of interests in
privacy:
First is the autonomous control over the development and expression of
one's intellect interests,tastes, and personality. These are rights protected
by the First Amendment and, in my view, they are absolute, permitting no
exceptions.... [T] hese aspects of the right of privacy are rights "retained
by the people" in the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.
Second is freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting
marriage,divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education and upbringingofchildren.. .. These rights are "fundamental," and we have held
that in order to support legislative action the statute must be narrowly and
precisely drawn and that a "compelling state interest" must be shown in
support of the limitation.
Third is the freedom to carefor one's health andperson,freedomfrom bodily restraint or compulsion,freedom to walk, stroll or loaf. These rights,
though fundamental, are likewise subject to regulation on a showing of
"compelling state interest."
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
142. See generally Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L.
REv.34 (1967); Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarificationof Concepts, 72 COLM. L.
REv. 693 (1972); Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUT. L. REv. 275 (1974); Soler, Of
Cannabisand the Courts:A CriticalExaminationof ConstitutionalChallengesto State
MarijuanaProhibitions,6 CoNN. L. REV. 601 (1974); Note, The Massachusetts Right of
Privacy Statute: Decoy or Ugly Duckling?, 9 SuFFoLK L REv. 1248 (1975); Symposium
in PRIVAcY (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971).
143. See generally Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L REV. 587, 604-18 (1977);
Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 L & CONTEMP. PaOBs. 253 (1966);'
Kurland, The Private I, 1976 U. CHL MAG., Autumn 11; Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1447 (1976); Note,
Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?,26 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1974).
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the fourth amendment - the right of privacy has at least two elements: the right to be free from governmental interference in certain
areas of paramount personal concern,14 and the right to avoid unwarranted disclosure by the government of important personal
1 45
matters.
The Right to Be Free From Governmental Intrusion in Areas of
FundamentalPersonal Concern
The element of the right of privacy most clearly recognized by the
courts is the right to make basic personal decisions free from unwarranted governmental intrusion, also referred to as "the right of autonomy". To invoke the right of autonomy, an individual must satisfy
three criteria: first, the government intrusion must involve a vital
personal interest concerning the most fundamental human matters;
second, the government action must significantly - not merely incidentally - interfere with this personal interest; and, third, either the
government action must not be necessary to advance a compelling
state interest, or the governmental action must be more invasive
of the personal interest than is required to advance the state in-

terest.' 46

FundamentalInterests. The loss of autonomy must involve matters
that are "fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty."' 47 Home
and family life, child bearing and rearing, and marriage are areas in
which the constitutional protection of privacy has been most clear. 148
There is no reason, however, to limit the protection of the right of
144. This branch of the right of privacy has been identified in Griswold, Roe and
other privacy cases, see note 171 infra, but it is not universally accepted. See Gavison,
Privacyand the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 438-39 (1980).
145. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977); note 158 infra.
146. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring), ; notes 110-33 supra. See generally, Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Let
Alone, 1976 DuKE L.J. 699; Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 Hxv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233
(1977). For a more complete discussion of the compelling state interest doctrine, see
notes 189-218 infra and accompanying text.
Other tests for invoking autonomy privacy have been proposed. Professor Soler, for
example, has suggested that the constitutional right of autonomy requires that the
conduct be personal to the actor, that the actor's interest in the aspects of the conduct
be personal, that the harm to the individual be significant,and that the conduct not
harm the public at large. Soler, supra note 142, at 697-98.
Another commentator has suggested the courts adopt a "none-of-their-business"
test under which an action that does not adversely affect anyone but the actor would
not be a legitimate government concern. Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose,
Sanctuaryand Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447,1480-81 (1976). A similar standard was apparently developed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Ravin v. State, 537
P.2d 494, 505 (Alaska 1975) (state cannot prohibit the use of marijuana in the home
without a showing that such use will harm other persons). See generally Comment,
Roe v. Wade and In re Quinlan: IndividualDecision and the Scope of Privacy'sConstitutional Guaranty, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 111, 150-54 (1977).
147. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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privacy to these areas. The Supreme Court has noted that the "outer
limits" of the constitutional right of privacy have not yet been established. 149 Other matters, including the personal interest in mental
and emotional health, are as basic and fundamental to ordered liberty as the rights related to family life and child bearing. One would
expect, therefore, that significant interference with such other fundamental interests, in the absence of a compelling state interest, would
also violate the right of privacy.
The concern of an individual for his own mental health is unquestionably a vital, and even paramount, personal interest. The ability to
seek effective psychotherapy is as important to a person suffering an
emotional or mental illness as the ability to seek an abortion is to a
woman experiencing an unwanted or dangerous pregnancy. Mental
illness may often be even more protracted and debilitating than an
unwanted pregnancy. By disrupting and hindering thought, decisionmaking, cognition, and mentation, psychological disabilities may interfere significantly with marriage, child rearing, and family life. In
addition to emotional suffering, mental illness may also interfere
with the exercise of many other human rights, including freedom of
religion, speech, and the press. 150 In fact, some level of mental health
is a sine qua non for the exercise of many of the basic freedoms and
civil rights.
Significant GovernmentalInterference. To invoke constitutional protection, the interference must significantly interfere with the ability
of an individual to control an important aspect of his life. An incidental or minor impediment to the exercise of individual autonomy does
not result in an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy, even
though some particularly sensitive people may find the invasion to be
significant. State record-keeping of information concerning abortions, for example, does not unconstitutionally burden the abortion
rights of women if the state ensures that the information will remain
secure from public view.1 51 Nor is a state system to record prescriptions for dangerous drugs unconstitutional, even though it may cause
some unusually sensitive patients to avoid or postpone needed medical treatment. 52 In both these circumstances, the interference with
149. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977).
150. Some courts have suggested that the concept of a right of privacy embodies
first amendment protection for the communication of ideas. They argue that free communication assumes that each individual has the capacity to produce ideas. As one
court noted, the mental ability to order one's thoughts and coherently express oneself
"is fundamental to our cherished right to communicate and is entitled to comparable
constitutional protection." Rogers v. Okn,478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D. Mass. 1979).
Another court stated, "If one is not protected in his thoughts, behavior, personality,
and identity, then the right of privacy becomes meaningless." Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973),
reported in 42 U.S.L.W. 2063-64 (July 10, 1973); see Shapiro, Legislating the Control of
Behavior Control Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies,47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 237, 258-76 (1974). But see Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143-44 (D.N.J. 1978)
(forced medication of involuntary mental patients that temporarily dulls the senses
may violate the right of privacy, but it does not violate the first amendment).
151. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976).
152. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977). Emphasizing that the government interference must be significant, the Court stated: "Nor can it be said that any individual
has been deprived of the right to decide independently, with the advice of his physi-
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the underlying privacy right is simply too tenuous to constitute a violation of that right.
Any significant burden on the exercise of the right of autonomy,
however, may be unconstitutional, even though the state has not pro-

hibited the activity altogether. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that a

state law permitting

only pharmacists

to sell

contraceptives unconstitutionally burdens the right to make fundamental decisions concerning childbearing by reducing access to contraceptives. 153 In another context, the Court held that a state cannot
constitutionally prohibit one form of second trimester abortion when

such a prohibition would increase the medical risks associated with
second trimester abortions. The state law was invalid because it seriously abridged the right to obtain an abortion, even though, it did not
ban second trimester abortions altogether.1 5 4 Similarly, the Court
struck down a statute requiring that abortions be performed only in
accredited hospitals because the law impermissibly burdened the
right to choose to have an abortion. 1 55 Reviewing these latter two decisions the Supreme Court in Carey v. PopulationServices15 6 concluded that "the same test must be applied to state regulations that
burden an individual's right to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit the
157
decision entirely."'
No clear line separates an insignificant annoyance to privacy interests from an impermissible burden on the exercise of the right of privacy. Though held impermissible in Carey, a state-imposed
requirement that contraceptives be sold only by a pharmacist hardly
seems overly burdensome. The law at issue in Carey only limited the
accessibility of contraceptives, "the opportunity for privacy of selection and purchase," and the "possibility of price competition;"'1 8 it
did not directly prohibit the use of contraceptives. Carey, therefore,
establishes that a state regulation may impermissibly burden the
right of privacy even though it does not approach a total prohibition
on the right to decide matters of fundamental personal concern. The
line between the state action held invalid in Carey and the state action held permissible in other cases, however, is difficult to discern.
Unlike the statute challenged in Carey, statutes that require physicians to maintain records on abortions and prescriptions may interThis case is therefore unlike those
cian, to acquire and to use needed medication ....
in which the Court held that a total prohibition of certain conduct was an impermissible deprivation of liberty." Id.
153. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686-91 (1977).
154. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976).
155. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193-95 (1973).
156. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
157. Id. at 688.
158. Id. at 689.
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fere only with the decisions of particularly sensitive individuals to
obtain abortions or medical services. 15 9
The difference between statutes regulating the performance of
abortions and the sale of contraceptives - which the Court struck
down - and statutes requiring the maintenance of records on abortions and prescriptions - which it upheld - is in the nature and extent of the burden placed upon the exercise of a fundamental right.
In each case in which a regulation was struck down, the exercise of a
fundamental right was limited or made more difficult by the regulation. In the case of reporting statutes, the Court's holding that the
state law did not constitute an impermissible burden is distinguished
by the fact that the reporting scheme probably would not affect the
decisions of persons of ordinary sensitivity. This distinction accounts for the Court's emphasis on the security arrangements to protect the release of the information. 160 Strict safeguards preserving
confidentiality may well have convinced the Court that the recordkeeping requirements would not affect the quality of medical services or deter a person of reasonable sensitivities from deciding to
seek the services. If the records had not been kept confidential, the
regulations might have influenced individuals not to exercise their
fundamental right to seek medical assistance and, therefore, infringed on their right of privacy. Thus, the absence of safeguards to
preserve the confidentiality of the data would have presented a differ161
ent and more difficult privacy question.
Forced governmental disclosure of the confidences of therapy
would constitute a significant interference with a fundamental personal interest. A state requirement that the confidences of therapy
be revealed would not of course, prohibit the practice of psychotherapy. The requirement would, however, disrupt effective therapy in
two ways. First, the possibility of public disclosure of confidential information may be so frightening or distasteful that the patient may
not enter therapy, or may be less inclined to disclose personal information in therapy. Second, the absence of a privilege may erode the
trust between therapist and patient upon which successful psychotherapy depends.
The personal nature of the information typically revealed in therapy makes it understandable that people of average sensitivity might
hesitate to be completely open in therapy, or to even enter therapy,
without an assurance of confidentiality. A variety of psychotherapy
experts have noted that confidentiality is essential to effective therapy.162 In addition, some limited empirical data gathered from poten159. See notes 151-52 supra and accompanying text.
160. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976).
161. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 605-606; Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. at 80-81; McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp 1355, 1381 (D.NJ. 1978).
162. See generally S. FREUD, 2 COLLECTED PAPERS 356 (Am. rev. ed. 1959); Group for
the Advancement of Psychiatry, Confidentialityand PrivilegedCommunicationsin the
Practice of Psychiatry, Rep. No. 45 (1960); Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Position Statement
on Confidentiality and Privilege with Special Reference to Psychiatric Patients, 124
Am. J. PsYcsnATRY 175 (1968); Am. Psychological Ass'n, Standardsfor Providersof Psy-
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tial patients indicates that the absence of confidentiality will cause
many people to avoid therapy or to be considerably less open in therapy. 1 63 As patients become less open in psychotherapy, the therapist
has less information with which to assist the patient. In fact, the
ideas, fantasies, and fears that a patient may be least likely to disclose without the assurance of confidentiality may be among the
most important to communicate to the therapist.
The threat to privacy resulting from the absence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege is considerably different from the threat to privacy inherent in state collection of medical information regarding
prescriptions and abortions. Confidentiality is more vital to effective
psychotherapy than it is to medical treatment generally. The relative
importance of confidentiality to psychotherapy treatment compared
with other medical treatment accounts for the general acceptance by
commentators of the need for a psychotherapist-patient privilege and
the general criticism of the physician-patient privilege.16 4 Moreover,
chological Services, APA MONITOR 19 (March 1975); Dubey, Confidentiality as a Requirement of the Therapist: Technical Necessities for Absolute Privilege in
Psychotherapy, 131 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1093 (1974); Foster, Group Psychotherapy: A
Pool of Legal Witnesses, 25 hr'L J. GRouP PSYCHOTHERAPY 50 (1975); Geiser & Rheingold, Psychology and the Legal Process: TestimonialPrivileged Communications, 19
Ame. PSYCHOLOGIST 831 (1964); Mykel, The Application of Ethical Standards to Group
Psychotherapyin a Community, 21 INr'L J. GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 248 (1971); Plant, A
Perspective on Confidentiality, 131 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1021 (1974); Shah, Privileged
Communications, Confidentialityand Privacy, 1 PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 59 (1969);
Slovenko & Usdin, The Psychiatrist& Privileged Communication, 4 ARcHEs GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 431 (1961); Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 CLEv. ST. L.
REV. 375 (1975); Trachtman, Pupils,Privacy and the School Psychologist, 27 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 37 (1972); Note, FunctionalOverlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals:Its Implicationsfor the Privileged CommunicationsDoctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1255
(1962); Siegel, Privacy, Ethics, and Confidentiality, paper presented to the American
Psychological Ass'n, 85th Annual Meeting, San Francisco, Aug. 27, 1977.
163. See Meyer & Smith, A Crisis in Group Therapy, 32 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 638, 63840 (1977). Meyer and Smith found that a substantial portion (81.8%) of respondents to
a questionnaire on confidentiality indicated that they would refuse to enter or would
be substantially less inclined to be open in group therapy without the assurance of
confidentiality. The respondents were third year university students. Id. Another
survey revealed that a substantial number of people thought they would be less open
in therapy if they knew their psychotherapist was legally obligated to release information from therapy. Note, FunctionalOverlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implicationsfor the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J.
1226, 1262 (1962). Willage and Meyer found that subjects were more open and candid
in answering personality inventories when confidentiality was assured than they were
if they thought the results of their survey might be released. Willage & Meyer, The
Effects of Varying Levels of Confidentiality on Self-Disclosure, 2 GROUP 88, 94-96 (1978).
Finally, a survey of therapists revealed that about one fourth of them had, within one
year, observed patients' reluctance to discuss violent tendencies when informed of the
possibility of a breach of the confidences of therapy. Project, Where the Public Peril
Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapiststo Determinethe Effects of Tarasoff,31 STAN. L.
REV. 165, 183 (1978).
164. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2285, 2380a, at 527-28, 828-32 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961); Chafee, PrivilegedCommunications, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 611 (1943); Degnan, The
Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARv. L. REV. 276, 300 (1962); Purrington, An
Abused Privilege, 6 COLuM. L. REV. 388, 395 (1906). But see D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER,
2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 215, at 593-603 (1978); Black, The Marital and Physician Privileges - A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DuKE U.J. 45, 50-51.

1980]

in its proposed federal rules of evidence, the Supreme Court recognized that the potential release of medical information is much less
disruptive to medical treatment than the potential release of information about psychotherapy is to therapy. The proposed rules provided
only for a psychotherapist-patient privilege, not a general physicianpatient privilege.
Even if a patient enters and attempts to be open in therapy, the
absence of a privilege may still interfere with effective therapy by
reducing the trust between the patient and the therapist. 165 Patients
who do not view their therapist as one in whom their confidences are
safe are likely to repress some feelings and emotions that might be
important to the treatment. The importance of trust between patient
and therapist has been widely recognized. 166 The Advisory Committee for the Supreme Court's proposed rules of evidence in its comments on the psychotherapist-patient privilege noted that "[t] here is
wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful
psychiatric treatment ....
A threat to secrecy blocks successful
treatment."' 67 Persuaded by this reasoning, the Court rejected arguments that successful treatment has prospered without the protec168
tion of a privilege, and that a privilege was therefore unnecessary.
165. See Slovenko, Psychotherapyand Confidentiality,24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 375, 395
(1975). Slovenko has suggested that trust between the patient and therapist is of utmost importance to successful therapy, and that the assurance of confidentiality is
otherwise of limited concern. Id.
166. See notes 161-63 supra. Justice Clark, dissenting in Tarasoff,17 Cal. 3d 425, 551
P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), emphasized the importance of trust between therapist
and patient:
[E]ven if the patient fully discloses his thoughts, assurance that the confidential relationship will not be breached is necessary to maintain his trust
in his psychiatrist - the very means by which treatment is effected. [T]he
essence of much psychotherapy is the contribution of trust in the external
world and ultimately in the self, modelled upon the trusting relationship
established during therapy. Patients will be helped only if they can form a
trusting relationship with the psychiatrist. All authorities appear to agree
that if the trust relationship cannot be developed because of collusive communication between the psychiatrist and others, treatment will be
frustrated.
Id. at 460, 551 P.2d at 359-60, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40 (quoting Dawidoff, The Malpractice
of Psychiatrists,1966 DuKE L.J. 696, 704) (other citations omitted).
167. Proposed Rules of Evidence, Rule 504, Advisory Committee's Note (quoting
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Confidentialityand Privileged Communications in the Practiceof Psychiatry,Rep. No. 45, at 92 (1960)), reprintedin 56 F.R.D. 183,
242 (1973). The Advisory Committee continued: 'The relationship may well be likened
to that of the priest-penitent or the lawyer-client. Psychiatrists not only explore the
very depths of their patients' conscious, but their unconscious feelings and attitudes as
well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness and,
in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely." Id.
168. See id. By providing for a psychotherapist-patient privilege in the Proposed
Rules of Evidence, the Court concluded that the privilege was necessary and useful
The Court reached a different conclusion in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972),
about the necessity for a news reporters' privilege. The Court stated: "From the beginning of our country the press has operated without constitutional protection for
press informants, and the press has flourished. The existing constitutional rules have
not been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of confidential news
sources by the press." Id.. at 689-99.
The potential effects of a psychotherapist-patient privilege upon the legal system are
difficult to predict. Slovenko has suggested that the protection of confidences in states
without a psychiatrist-patient privilege is no different from protection in states with
the privilege. In other words, the protection afforded does not increase after a state
has adopted the privilege. Slovenko, Psychotherapist-PatientTestimonial Privilege: A
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The possibility that the state will require disclosure of the confidences of therapy may also affect other important individual rights.
For some patients, the threat of disclosure may preclude the option
of obtaining effective therapy. This serious interference with the
ability of some people to obtain successful therapy to treat, prevent,
or alleviate mental illness seriously burdens the privacy right of autonomy. State interference with effective therapy may also affect
first amendment rights. 16 9 Assuming that one of the essential interests protected by the first amendment is the right to think and believe what one chooses, the opportunity to obtain effective therapy is
necessary for some people to be able to exercise this first amendment
right. Mental illness may prevent one from understanding religious
and political ideas, or interfere with the ability to communicate ideas.
Some level of mental health is necessary to be able to form belief and
value systems and to engage in rational thought. By interfering with
effective psychotherapy, therefore, the state may violate both elements of the right of privacy and impair the opportunity of a patient
to exercise rights to free thought and belief guaranteed by the first
amendment. The compelling state interest doctrine may, however,
provide a justification for the state to interfere with the rights of

privacy.
UnwarrantedDisclosure of PersonalMatters
The right to prevent the disclosure of very personal matters, often
referred to as "information or informational privacy," has received
less judicial attention than autonomy privacy,17 0 a phenomenon that
had led some scholars to suggest that informational privacy is not
included within the constitutional right of privacy. 17 1 The Supreme
Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 649, 658-59 (1974). Ironically, though he
presented no evidence of the ineffectiveness of the privilege, he did present some evidence that the privilege does make a difference. Id. at 658-59 n.20. Many protections
provided by the privilege are not readily apparent - e.g., the elimination of discovery
fishing expeditions. The critical effect of the privilege, of course, is not on legal relationships, but on the relationship between psychotherapist and patient. The real success or failure of the privilege is determined by whether it increases the willingness of
patients to be open and forthright in therapy. A considerable amount of professional
opinion has concluded that the privilege encourages openness, see note 162 supra,and
some preliminary data indicates that potential patients find the privilege very important to openness, see note 163 supra.
169. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143-44 (D.N.J. 1978); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063-64, No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
County, Mich., July 10, 1973); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients'
Right to Refuse Treatment 72 Nw. U. L REV. 461, 492-97 (1977); Shapiro, Legislating the
Controlof Behavior Control Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies,47
S. CAL L. REV. 237, 253-76 (1974).
170. The right of information privacy described here applies only to the disclosure
of information. It does not include protection against methods of collecting information the disclosure of which would otherwise violate the right of privacy. Limitations
on collection methods employed by the government are contained in the fourth, fifth,
and fourteenth amendments. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
171. See Henldn, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLum. L REV. 1410, 1411 (1974); Note,
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Court, however, has subsequently identified the protection of certain
very personal information as part of the constitutional right of privacy. 172 For example, the Court has suggested that government disclosure of some kinds of information regarding individual medical
73
treatment may violate the right of privacy.
Four criteria must be satisfied to properly invoke constitutional information privacy. First, the information involved must be of a highly
personal and sensitive nature. Second, the information must be private, i.e., not available to the public, before it is sought by the state.
Third, protection against the release of information to persons
outside a limited governmental body must be inadequate, or the information must be so extremely sensitive and personal that the very
collection of the information by the state alone offends individual privacy. Finally, there must be either (1) no compelling state interest in
obtaining and maintaining the information or, (2) some other method
of advancing the state interest that is less invasive of personal rights.
The first three criteria determine the nature of the information that
deserves constitutional protection. The fourth criterion concerns
whether the state's infringement of individual privacy is justified by
the furtherance of an important state interest.
PersonalInformation. The right of privacy protects only those kinds
of information that people generally regard as highly confidential and
that they release to others only for the most compelling reasons. 174
The more the information reveals about intimate physical characteristics or mental processes of a person, the more likely it is to be of a
highly confidential nature. For example, information about a person's property or possessions is much less likely to be of such a personal nature that he would regard it as highly confidential or refuse
On Privacy: ConstitutionalProtectionfor PersonalLiberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670, 77072 (1973); Comment, Roe v. Wade and In re Quinlan: Individual Decision and the
Scope of Privacy's ConstitutionalGuarantee,12 U.S.F. L. REv. 111, 119 (1977). But see
Ely, The Wages of Crying WoV. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 929-30
(1973) (arguing that the right of privacy should primarily restrict data gathering).
172. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.24 (1977). The Whalen Court stated:
"The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at
least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. . . ." Id. at 599-600 (citations omitted); see Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-59 (1977) (noting the individual interest in
information privacy).
For a collection of federal and state cases involving informational privacy, see Leigh,
InformationalPrivacy: ConstitutionalChallenges to the Collection and Dissemination
of PersonalInformation by Government Agencies, 3 HASTiNGS CoNsT. L.Q. 229, 231-45
(1976). See generally A. WESTEN, PRIvAcY AND FREEDOM 33 (1970); Project, Government
Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 971, 1282-97 (1975); Note, Informational Privacy: The Concept Its Acceptance and Affect on State Information
Practices, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 273 (1976); Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a
Principle?,26 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1974).
173. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-606 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80-81 (1976).
174. Leigh has described this kind of information as that "which a person desires to
keep private and which, if disseminated, would tend to cause substantial concern, anxiety or embarrassment to a reasonable person." Leigh, InformationalPrivacy: Constitutional Challenges to the Collection and Dissemination of Personal Information by
GovernmentAgencies, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 229, 251 (1976); see Note, Constitutional
Right of Privacyand Investigative Consumer Reports: Little Brotheris Watching Yoz4
2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 773, 792-96 (1975).
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to release it except in unusual circumstances.1 7 5
As a general matter, no information is more intensely personal and
private than the information revealed in psychotherapy. Psychotherapy deals not only with information about a person, the disclosure of
which may be embarrassing or harmful, but also with the patient's
most intimate fantasies, fears, and anxieties. It deals with the very
essence of a person and may well concern certain subjects that create such anxiety in a patient that they have been relegated to the
subconscious. 1 7 6 The patient is expected to talk with the therapist
about feelings and matters which the patient would not consider revealing to anyone else. 7 7 Because of the often extremely personal
nature of the information revealed in therapy, in no other relationship is the right to be free from public disclosure of that personal
78
information likely to be so highly desired as in psychotherapy.
175. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); California Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 63 (1974); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978); cf.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976) (there is a privacy interest in tax
records, but the state interest in the records is overriding); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973) (there is no privacy interest in tax records).
176. Anxiety surrounding the release of information concerning therapy may be increased by the psychotherapists' use of terms that have clear technical meaning but
may have quite a different connotation to the lay public. The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry has noted: 'The confusion and misunderstanding which can result
from inappropriate testimony iswell illustrated by a newspaper article of a few years
ago which reported that a psychiatrist testifying in a criminal trial stated that the defendant suffered from an unresolved Oedipus complex and wished to have intercourse
with his mother. It is not hard to imagine what effect this had upon the jury." Group
for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Confidentialityand Privileged Communicationsin
the Practiceof Psychiatry, Rep. No. 45, at 93 (1960).
177. Several courts have found Guttmacher and Weihofen's statement of the intensely private nature of therapy persuasive:
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world.
He exposes to the therapist not only what his words directly express; he
lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins and his shame.
Most patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what will be
expected of them, and that they cannot get help except on that condition .... It would be too much to expect of them to do so if they knew that
all they say - and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they say - may
be revealed to the whole world from a witness stand.
M. GUTrIIACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, 22 PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952); see Caesar v.
Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufstedler, concurring and dissenting),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431, 467 P.2d 557, 567, 85
Cal. Rptr. 829, 839 (1970).
178. The participants in a confessional protected by the priest-penitent privilege or
couples in marriage protected by the husband-wife privilege arguably may desire privacy more than the patient in therapy. During the course of therapy, however, the
participant may reveal the same information revealed in a confessional; the husband
or wife is likely to reveal in therapy the most private aspects of the marital relationship. The information revealed in therapy, therefore, would be at least as sensitive as
that protected by the priest-penitent or the husband-wife privilege. These common
law testimonial privileges are not meant so much to directly protect the right of privacy as they are to foster a socially important relationship by allowing complete freedom of discussion without fear of public disclosure. See R. SLOVENKO,
PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

8-14 (1966); 8 J.

EVIDENCE §§ 2285, 2290, at 527, 543 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Louisell &
Kent, The Supreme Court of California1969-1970, Foreword: Reflections on the Law of
WIGMORE,
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Confidential Information. Two factors determine whether information is confidential or "private." First, the information must not be
generally available to the public. Protecting the privacy of information that is already public would be meaningless. Second, the person
must have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. 179 A patient
usually has a high expectation that the information revealed in therapy will remain confidential. 180 The codes of ethics of major psychiatric and psychological organizations require therapists to maintain
confidentiality, and therapists often assure patients that their confidences will be protected. 181 Even in group therapy, in which a
number of patients participate, each patient usually has an obligation
to maintain the confidentiality of the communications of the other
group members. 182 Finally, the obligation to prevent disclosure of
the confidences of therapy is often recognized and enforced by law; in
these jurisdictions, a therapist who improperly reveals the confi183
dences of patients may be subject to civil liability.
Protectionfrom Release. Some forms of personal information may be
collected and stored by the state, provided the confidentiality of the
information is protected so that the information is not released bePrivileged Communications- The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilegein Perspective, 59
CAiF. L. REV. 30, 32 (1971).
179. The reasonable expectation of confidentiality in information privacy is analogous to the "expectation" of privacy in fourth amendment cases. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-59 (1977).
The importance of a person's expectation of privacy in determining the extent of
privacy interests can be traced to Justice Taft's opinion in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 468-69 (1928) and was clearly enunciated by the Court in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967). See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52
(1971).
The Court has indicated that the following situations do not involve a reasonable
expectation of privacy: conversations with a hired private investigator, Osborn v.
United States, 385 U.S. 323,331 (1966); conversations in jail, Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S.
139, 143 (1962); conversations with friends in one's own store, On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952). See generally O'Brien, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy:
Principlesand Policies of FourthAmendment-Protected Privacy, 13 NEW ENG. L. REV.
662 (1978); Note, Formalism Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HA~v. L. REV. 945 (1977); Note, Fourth
Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. REv. 1314 (1967).
180. See Meyer & Smith, A Crisis in Group Therapy, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 638, 63940 (1977); Swoboda, Elwork, Sales & Levine, Knowledge and Compliance with Privileged Communication and Child Abuse Reporting Laws, 9 PROF. PSYCH. 448,449 (1978);
Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implicationsfor the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE LJ. 1226, 1255 (1962); Willage, Group Therapists' Understanding of Privileged Communication and
Confidentiality, paper presented to the American Psychological Ass'n, 85th'Annual
Meeting, San Francisco, Aug. 27, 1977.
181. See, e.g., Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Position Statement on Confidentiality and
Privilege with Special Reference to PsychiatricPatients, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 175,
175-76 (Jan. 1968); Am. Psychological Ass'n, Standardsfor Providersof Psychological
Services, APA MoNrIoR 19 (Mar. 1975).
182. See Cross, PrivilegedCommunicationsBetween Participantsin Group Psychotherapy, 1970 L. & Soc. ORD. 191, 198-99 (1970); Morgan, Must the Group Get Up and
Testify? An Examination of Group Therapy Privilege, 2 GRouP 67, 70-73 (1978); Mykel,
The Application of Ethical Standards to Group Psychotherapy in a Community, 21
INT'L J. GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 248 (1971); Note, Group Therapy and Privileged Communication, 43 IND. L.J. 93, 104 (1967).
183. See Eger, Psychotherapists'Liabilityfor ExtrajudicialBreachesof Confidentiality, 18 A=iz. L. REv. 1061, 1094 (1976); cf. Cooper, The Physician'sDilemma: Protection of the Right to Privacy, 22 ST. Louis U. L.J. 397, 412-18 (1978) (involving medical
information generally). See generally Note, Roe v. Doe: A Remedy for Disclosure of
Psychiatric Confidences, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 191 (1975).
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yond a limited portion of the government. 8 4 For example, a state
may obtain and keep information concerning medical prescriptions,
even though that information may be private, but at the same time
the state may be obligated to protect the information from public disclosure.1 85 Similarly, states may collect and maintain ordinary personal data, but they must implement security systems to safeguard
against the release of sensitive information.
The degree of protection required depends primarily upon the nature of the information involved. The more highly personal and sensitive the information, the greater the protection necessary, and the
more limited the distribution permissible. Records of medical prescriptions, for example, may require less protection than records concerning intimate matters such as sexual habits. At one extreme,
some information is so personally sensitive that the state probably
in
cannot compel release of the information at all, except perhaps, for186
camera inspection and only for the most extraordinary reasons.
At the other extreme, the release of information in a manner that
makes identification of its source impossible, as with publication of
loss of privacy as long as the inforaggregate data, results in no real
187
mation was gathered lawfully.
Because of the extremely personal nature of the information revealed in therapy, it is doubtful whether any safeguard could adequately protect against or limit its release at trial without rendering
the information useless. In the context of litigation, for example, any
disclosure of the confidences of therapy at trial results in some public
disclosure because of the public nature of the proceedings. Presumably, any information received during a trial would be a matter of public record. Requiring a person to disclose to the court the confidences
184. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,456-65 (1977); McKenna
v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1382 (D.N.J. 1978); cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1960) (the absence of adequate safeguards to protect the security of information was
one basis for striking down a law requiring teachers to inform school boards of all

organizations to which they belonged).
Protective measures need be implemented only with regard to information which
the state in some manner requires that citizens provide, or which is gathered Without
the free consent of the citizen. The government is not required to safeguard information a citizen freely provides for general release by the government. Moreover, a person may freely consent to the release of any information, personal or not, but in doing
so, waives the privacy of that information.
185. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 80-81 (1975).
186. See A. MILER, THE ASSUALT ON PRIVACY (1971); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 398 (1967); Donner, PoliticalIntelligence: Cameras,Informers and Files, in PRIVACY IN A FREE SOcIETY, Final Report of the Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren

Conference on Advocacy in the United States 57 (1964); Pipe, Privacy: Establishing
Restrictions on Government Inquiry, 18 Am. U. L REV. 516, 542 (1969). See generally
Greguras, Informational Privacy and the Private Sector, 11 CREIGHTON L REV. 312
(1977).
187. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 580-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), discussed at
notes 87-93 supra and accompanying text.
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revealed in therapy would effectively eliminate any protection of the
information from public view. Although courts might be able to fashion protective orders to limit the amount or use of information released, they could not hold the information in strict confidence and
totally prevent its general release. The absence of a psychotherapistpatient privilege in litigation, therefore, is tantamount to the state requiring public release of information of the most sensitive kind. In a
broader context than litigation, some information is so sensitive and
personal that no security arrangements could adequately safeguard
against disclosure. In these situations, a state should not be permitted to collect information at all, at least absent a compelling state interest "of the highest order." 88 Because the confidences of therapy
are often of an extremely sensitive nature, the courts must place
some limitations on the power of the state to compel disclosure to the
government.
Compelling State Interest
A state may interfere with fundamental personal rights, including the
right of privacy, when necessary to advance a legitimate compelling
state interest. 189 Protecting a viable fetus, for example, is a compelling interest that may justify a state limitation on the right of a woman to obtain an abortion - a right clearly within the woman's right
of privacy. 190 The compelling state interest doctrine, however, cannot
be applied without limitation. An absolute application of the doctrine, permitting a state to violate any fundamental right in pursuit of
every compelling interest, would result in an unacceptable invasion
of personal liberty. For example, the state cannot justify the use of
extremely invasive procedures on the ground that the procedures enable it to obtain evidence for use at trial.' 91 The state, of course, has
some interest in obtaining and preserving all relevant evidence for
trial to ensure the fair administration of justice 92 But if this interest
alone could routinely defeat even fundamental personal rights, personal privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination,
would be virtually meaningless. If the state needed evidence regarding a pregnancy and the evidence could be obtained only if the pregnancy went to term, the state's compelling interest would surely not
justify forcing the woman to carry the fetus to term to preserve the
evidence.
A state interest may justify interference with a fundamental right
only if five criteria are satisfied. First, a compelling interest of the
state must be involved. Second, the state must not seek to interfere
with an "essential interest." Third, the means chosen to further the
state interest must be the least restrictive reasonable alternative
188. See McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1381 (D.N.J. 1978).
189. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
190. Id. at 163-64.
191. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (court reversed the defendant's
drug conviction because incriminating evidence was obtained through the use of invasive medical procedures).
192. See note 198 infra and accompanying text.
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available to the state. Satisfaction of this criterion requires that the
state activity or regulation used to promote the compelling state interest be as narrowly drawn as possible to provide for the least interference with personal rights and that it be the means the least
invasive of fundamental rights available to the state. Fourth, the
state interest must in fact be significantly advanced by the state ac-

tivity or regulation. Finally, the compelling state interest advanced
must be greater than the harm inflicted upon the fundamental right.
Compelling Interests. The Supreme Court has identified three general compelling state interests: 1 93 preventing violent overthrow of the
government,19 4 preserving democracy, 95 and resolving or accommodating conflicts between fundamental rights. 1 96 This list, however, is
193. See generally Note, Of Interests, Fundamentaland Compelling: The Emerging
ConstitutionalBalance, 57 B.U. L. REV. 462, 479-93 (1977). These three compelling interests have been characterized as all being part of the general compelling state interest in preserving a constitutional democratic state. Id. at 479. Some commentators
have identified a fourth class of cases upholding government infringement of fundamental rights. These cases do not actually sanction governmental abridgment of the
fundamental right, but only permit governmental interference with certain aspects of
the right other than those core elements that make the right fundamental. Id. at 47980. For example, the court has generally upheld regulation of speech when the government's interest was contained in the non-communicative aspect of the speaker's conduct. Id. at 479.
194. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944) (wartime detention). Korematsu indicates that the Court views this interest as justifying a wide
range of government activities.
195. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (limiting campaign
contributions); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733 (1974) (limiting access to ballot);
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565
(1973) (restricting political rights of federal employees). In each of these cases, the
Court held that the state interest in promoting political stability, avoiding voter confusion, and ensuring proper operation of democratic processes justified interference with
individual political rights.
196. Courts have identified this compelling interest in three categories of fundamental rights: (1) first amendment, see, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700-701
(1972) (first amendment right of a newsman to refuse to divulge news sources conflicted with the state interest in preservation of property and the safety of citizens);
Rowan v. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970) (preservation of right of privacy conflicted with the right of a mail-order company to distribute "pandering" advertisements); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1966) (defendant's right to a fair
trial weighed against right of a newsman to cover a trial); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
81 (1949) (right of a defendant to broadcast announcements from a sound truck conflicted with the right of citizens to be free from unwarranted noise); Action v. Gannon,
450 F.2d 1227, 1232-33 (8th Cir. 1971) (right of church members to religious worship
conflicted with the right of human rights advocates to demonstrate); (2) due process,
see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (preserving the life of a fetus conflicted
with the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347
U.S. 442,452 (1954) (physician's right to a medical license weighed against state's right
to regulate medical profession); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (right
of the state to protect public health conflicted with the individual's right not to be vaccinated); and (3) equal protection, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976)
(state right to protect public safety conflicted with the right of appellant not to be discriminated against on the basis of sex). See generally Note, Of Interests,Fundamental
and Compelling: The Emerging ConstitutionalBalance,supra note 193, at 482-86. The
courts have not yet resolved the conflicts between the right of privacy of a minor to
decide to have an abortion and her parents' right of privacy in child rearing and between the right of privacy and free speech. In resolving these conflicts, the govern-
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by no means exclusive. The state potentially has several other compelling interests that might justify interference with the privacy
rights of therapy. Under special circumstances, interests such as
avoiding death and serious injury to citizens might justify an intrusion into the privacy of therapy. 97 The state also has a compelling
interest in acquiring all relevant evidence to ensure fair administration of justice. 98
The state's compelling interest in having all relevant testimony
poses a major threat to a constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege. Because the very purpose of a privilege is to prevent the state
from obtaining certain material evidence, recognition of a compelling
state interest in obtaining all relevant testimony sufficient to justify
the release of confidential information in all cases would emasculate
a constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege. The operation of
the other criteria necessary to invoke the compelling state interest
doctrine, however, prevents this complete destruction of the
privilege.
Essential Interests. Some rights protected by the constitution are so
basic or "essential" that even a compelling state interest may not justify their violation. 199 Many rights are derived from language in the
Constitution that clearly indicates they are not absolute;200 other
rights are only related to or implement essential interests. 20 ' A few
rights may be absolute, in that they go to the very essence of the individual interests protected by the Constitution.
The interests protected by the first and fifth amendments are examples of "essential" interests. One essential interest protected by
the first amendment is the right of an individual to believe and to
think freely. No compelling interest of the state would justify a prohibition of certain beliefs or thoughts. 20 2 An essential right protected
by the fifth amendment is the right of an individual to refuse to proment inevitably will infringe or compromise some fundamental rights in order to
effectuate others.
197. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 438, 551 P.2d 334, 347, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976).
198. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 695-701 (1972); Miller v. Colonial Refrig. Transp., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 741, 746 (M.D.
Pa. 1979); Note, From the Mouths of Babes: Does the ConstitutionalRight of Privacy
Mandate a Parent-ChildPrivilege?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1002, 1020-22.
199. The "essential interest" test perhaps could be merged with the fifth criterion,
which requires that individual rights be harmed less than the degree to which the state
interest is advanced. Any "essential interest" would be so heavily favored in such a
comparison that virtually no state interest would be sufficient to overcome the "essential interest." The "essential interest" test has two advantages. First, it expressly recognizes that some individual rights cannot be defeated by compelling state interests.
Second, the test avoids the balancing of interests in some situations. See note 208
supra.
200. See U.S. CONST. amend. III (quartering of troops); id. amend. IV (search and
seizure); id. amend. V (deprivation of property). These constitutional provisions protect only against peace time quartering of troops, unreasonablesearches and seizures,
and taking of property without reasonable compensation.
201. See Note, supra note 193, at 479-80. The "Miranda rights," for example, implement the right to avoid self-incrimination and the right to counsel.
202. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (speech that does not
incite others to imminent lawless action is immunized from government control);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (observing that the "freedom to believe" is absolute).
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vide testimony by which the state convicts him of a crime. Even the
state's interest in having all relevant testimony - a state interest
that has been described as "compelling" to ensure a fair trial - cannot overcome the individual's right to withhold self-incriminating testimony. Only when that essential interest is no longer involved, for
example when the prosecution has granted immunity, can the state's
compelling interest in having the testimony overcome the fifth
203
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Although the courts have recognized the importance of the right to
privacy, 2° 4 they have not classified it as an "essential interest." Consequently, a state is not completely precluded from interfering with
the right of privacy and the confidences of therapy when necessary to
advance a compelling state interest.
Least Restrictive Reasonable Alternative. A legitimate state interference with the constitutional right of privacy must be as limited and
as narrowly drawn as possible. 20 5 When information privacy is involved, the state must precisely and narrowly define the scope of the
information sought or maintained and limit its distribution. In addition, less invasive means of achieving the compelling state objective
must not be available. Security measures may be required to avoid
accidental or unauthorized release of the information. Similarly,
when autonomy privacy is involved, the intrusion into extremely personal matters must be as limited as is reasonably possible, and the
state must be unable to promote the compelling interest by employing a less intrusive procedure.
Because of the extremely personal nature of information often disclosed in therapy, the state has a significant responsibility to restrict
the collection of psychological data and to control its distribution.
This responsibility may dictate that the state provide a testimonial
privilege protecting the confidences of therapy. Even if such a broad
privilege is not required, however, a broad state rule or procedure
that permits the government routinely to interfere with the privacy of
therapy in order to provide evidence for trial does not sufficiently
limit the invasion of a patient's right to informational privacy. Cer203. See, e.g., Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956).
204. See, e.g., Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Characterizing the elevated significance of the right of privacy, the Cressman court stated that
"the right to privacy is on an equal or possibly more elevated pedestal than some individual Constitutional rights and should be treated with as much deference as free
speech." Id.
205. See Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). The Roe Court stated that "Where
certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting
these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and that legislative

enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake." Id. at 155 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)); see Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 680
n.19 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-50 (1972); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-308 (1940).

19801

tainly, not all communication between patient and therapist will be
relevant at trial. A state, therefore, has a duty at least to ensure that
only information absolutely necessary to a complete and fair trial is
released.
A state may avoid the unnecessary release of very personal information in several ways: (1) it may permit inquiry into psychotherapist-patient communications only when the information is not
available from another source; (2) it may provide for in camera judicial inspection of the information to ensure that only the most limited
amount of personal information is released; and (3) it may restrict an
adverse party's inquiry to that information clearly relevant to the issue before the court. 20 6 Few jurisdictions have employed these safeguards. This failure to safeguard against unnecessary intrusions into
information privacy raises serious doubts whether these jurisdictions
can legitimately rely on the compelling state interest in obtaining all
relevant testimony to justify an interference with the privacy of
207
therapy.
Actual Advancement of State Interest. The narrowly drawn regulation or activity must also actually and significantly advance the state
interest.20 8 For example, claims that laws against the sale of contraceptives to singles or minors advance the interest of the state in encouraging adherence to the criminal fornication law are not effective,
in part, because the prohibition on contraceptive sales is unlikely to
reduce or eliminate fornication. 20 9 Without this limitation on the
compelling state interest doctrine, governments might claim that
every state regulation furthered a compelling interest, even though it
promoted that interest in only the most trivial or tenuous manner.
Requiring that the confidences of therapy be revealed in court advances the state's interest in having evidence for trial. This promotion of the state interest, however, may be more apparent than real.
As patients recognize that their confidences may be revealed, they
206. Judge Hufstedler has suggested similar limitations on the patient-litigant exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d
1064, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
207. At least one authority believes that evidentiary requirements - especially the
requirements of relevancy and materiality - provide better protection for the confidences of therapy than the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Slovenko, Psychotherapist-PatientTestimonial Privilege: A Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 CATm. U. L REV.
649, 657-60, 673 (1974).
208. This criterion may be considered a component of the fifth criterion - that the
benefits to the state will be advanced more than the fundamental right harmed. If the
state action does not advance a legitimate state interest, the "benefits" would be nonexistent and any substantial harm to fundamental rights should invalidate the state
regulation. The fifth criterion, however, essentially requires a balancing of costs (harm
to the patient's privacy interest) and benefits. Because of the absence of apparent
constitutional standards to guide balancing determinations, the Supreme Court may
be reluctant to use such an analysis. See generally Duval, Free Communication of
Ideas and the Questfor Truth. Toward a Teleological Approach to FirstAmendment
Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. T. REV. 161, 172-87 (1972). By applying the "actual advancement of the state interest" test, courts can often avoid difficulty encountered in
balancing.
209. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 697-99 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 449-50 (1972); ef. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75
(1976) (the Court discounted claims that requiring parental or spousal consent prior to
a minor's abortion would promote family or marital relationships).
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can be expected to minimize the confidential information revealed in
therapy, especially if they have any reason to believe that their therapy or confidences may become the subjects of litigation. By making
patient communications vulnerable to discovery, therefore, the state
will ultimately limit, rather than increase, the evidence available
from psychotherapy. Currently, patients and therapists alike seem

to substantially overestimate the degree of protection afforded to the
confidences of therapy.2 10

Extensive publication of instances of

forced disclosure of confidential psychotherapist-patient communications would undoubtedly result in greater appreciation of the threat
to confidentiality. Paradoxically, by demanding that the information
from therapy be revealed in court, a state may tend to remove from
therapy the very information it seeks. Whether mandated disclosure
or the confidences of therapy significantly advances a compelling
state interest in obtaining testimony is therefore questionable.
Advancement of State Interest Versus Harm to FundamentalRights:
Striking the Balance. Even if the state can demonstrate that each of
the previous criteria has been met, the compelling state interest doctrine cannot be properly invoked if the benefit to the state interest
will be less than the harm to the fundamental personal right.21 1 This
determination requires a court to balance the benefits to the compelling state interests against the severity of the infringement of fundamental rights. A state regulation that will advance a compelling state
interest only slightly, and at a significant cost to a fundamental personal right, should not receive constitutional approval. For example,
the state's interest in having all relevant evidence would not justify
torture of a witness reluctant to testify against another, or the insistence that a pregnant woman carry a fetus to term to provide evidence for a trial. In these situations, the state's interest, though
compelling, is not as important as the personal interest in privacy
and freedom from torture.
Advancement of a state interest and harm to a fundamental right
are compared by calculating the net gain or benefit to the state and
the net loss or harm to the individual. The real value of the state
interest promoted by the action is the total benefit to the state interest less any accompanying losses incurred by the state as a result of
210. See note 180 supra.
211. In determining whether state interests justify regulation or interference by the
state, the Court will "look to the extent of the burden that they place on individual
rights." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976). At least one court has indicated that the
Supreme Court is implicitly relying on a balancing test in every privacy case that involves an identified compelling state interest. Hawaii Psych. Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F.
Supp. 1028, 1043 (D. Hawaii 1979).
See Marcus, The Forum of Conscience:Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise
Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1245; Silver, The Futureof ConstitutionalPrivacy, 21 ST. I
U. L. REV. 211, 226 (1977). See generally Note, Of Interests, Fundamentaland Compelling: The Emerging ConstitutionalBalance, 57 B.U. I REV. 55 (1977).
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the activity. For example, the net benefits of a regulation that prohibits the use of one method of abortion because it presents a somewhat
higher risk of infection than another method should not be calculated
as the total health improvement resulting from the decrease in infections. Instead, if the approved method of abortion increases the
chance of hemorrhage or if it presents a substantial risk to the
mental health of women, those "costs," measured in terms of the
state interest in the overall health of its citizens, should be subtracted from the "benefits" to that interest resulting from the state
2 12
regulation.
The true measure of the harm to a fundamental personal right is
the difference between the harm to that right and any accompanying
additions or gains to that right resulting from the state action. 2 13 The
harm to freedom of speech resulting from a regulation that limits the
right of a person to interrupt a speaker at a town meeting, for example, should be reduced by the increased protection accorded that person, whose first amendment rights are enhanced by his own
opportunity to speak at the meeting free of interruption. The harm to
one's personal rights might be accompanied by gains to other personal rights; these gains should be included as a part of the net gain
to state interests. 214 Finally, in calculating the net loss to the right of
privacy resulting from state actions, courts might consider the degree
to which an individual can in some way avoid the invasion of privacy:
The more control an individual has over the governmental intrusion,
215
the less harmful the interference with the right of privacy.
Courts are not able, of course, to compare the costs (in terms of
individual rights) and benefits (in terms of state interests) with precision. The Supreme Court has indicated that its function is not to
choose between constitutional rights and interests of approximate
212. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976) (invalidating a
Missouri statute that prohibited the use of saline amniocentesis in second trimester
abortions because, as a practical matter, the law did not promote the state's interest in
protecting maternal health).
213. One must take care when employing this analysis to avoid "double counting"
by using a factor both to reduce the benefit of a state regulation and to increase the
cost of the regulation.
214. For example, two rights might be promoted by the absence of privileges: the
right to obtain evidence for trial and the right to the correct adjudication of disputes.
The gain to these rights would be included as part of the net gains to state interests.
215. Some courts have apparently adopted this approach. For example, the Caesar,
Lifschutz, and McKenna courts all concluded that the harm to privacy interests was
lessened by the power each individual had to avoid the government intrusion. Both
the Lischutz and the Caesar courts, noting that the patients had chosen to bring their
mental conditions into question in the litigation, implied that the patients could have
avoided any invasion of their privacy by not raising the issue of their mental condition
in court. Caesar v. Montanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
954 (1977); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 429-35, 467 P.2d 557, 570, 85 CaL Rptr. 829, 838-42
(1970); see notes 17-57 supra and accompanying text. The reasoning of the court in
McKenna was similar. Because the applicants for fire-fighter positions applied for the
positions voluntarily, they ultimately controlled whether their mental condition would
be examined by the state. See McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1360-61 (D.N.J.
1978); see notes 94-102 supra and accompanying text. In each of these cases, the individuals did not "voluntarily" waive any right of privacy because they would have had
to give up important rights to protect their privacy. Nonetheless, they were able to
exercise some level of control over whether their privacy was infringed. All three
courts apparently reasoned that such control reduces the net cost of the invasion.
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equal value. 2 16 The courts undoubtedly recognize what amounts to a
presumption that a state decision to promote a compelling state interest at the expense of a fundamental personal right is valid. Those
challenging the state action carry the burden of demonstrating that
the state action harms fundamental individual rights more than it
promotes compelling state interests. Despite the difficulties involved
in this determination, only by considering whether a state activity
does in fact promote a compelling state interest and whether the
state activity damages individual rights more than it benefits state
interests can courts strike down those governmental acts that needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously infringe upon fundamental personal rights.
The calculation of the net state benefits produced by requiring incourt disclosure of psychotherapist-patient communications requires
a public policy analysis similar to that used by the Advisory Committee, in considering a statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege in
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. The emphasis of such an
analysis shifts from concern for the right of the individual to concern
for society as a whole. 217 Under this approach, the interests of society in protecting the confidences of therapy should be compared with
the interest of society in obtaining all relevant information for trial.
The societal interest in protecting the confidentiality of therapy is
to promote emotional and mental health, which ultimately will reduce antisocial activity and other societal burdens that result from
untreated or poorly treated mental problems. Successful psychotherapy may reduce social problems such as juvenile delinquency,
marital complications, and violent crime2 8 It may also reduce the
cost of caring for dependents of the mentally ill and increase the productivity of those with mental deficiencies or difficulties. Successful
psychotherapy apparently requires, and thus the benefits of therapy
presumably depend upon, the protection of the confidences of the
2 19
patient.
In recent years, legal commentators, as well as the drafters of
model statutes, and the Supreme Court,220 have been nearly unani216. See San Antonio Ind.School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).
217. See Advisory Committee Notes, Proposed Rule 504, reprintedin 56 F.R.D. 183,
241-44 (1973). The Supreme Court in Branzburg seemed to consider the constitutional
claims for a news reporter's privilege on a general public policy level: "The heart of the
claim is that the burden on news gathering resulting from compelling reporters to disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest in obtaining the information." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
218. See generally J. MELTZOFF & M. KORNREICH, RESEARCH IN PSYCHOTHERAPY
(1970); Burton, Encounter,Existence and Psychotherapy, in ENCOUNTER 7,8-9 (A. Burton ed. 1969); Hansell, Casualty Management Method, 19 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
231 (1968).
219. See notes 161-63 supra and accompanying text.
220. Proposed Rule 504, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41 (1972).

19801

mous in suggesting that a psychotherapist-patient privilege would be
in the best interests of society.22 1 Professor Wigmore, a vigorous opponent of testimonial privileges, 222 suggested that a privilege can be
justified only upon the satisfaction of four criteria: "(1) the communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentialitymust be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between parties; (3) the
relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulouslyfostered; (4) the injury that would inure to the relation
the
by the disclosure of the communications must be greater '2than
23
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
221. See C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 9 n.9, at 213 (2d ed.
E. Cleary 1972); R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 38-39 (1966); Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participantsin
Group Psychotherapy, 1970 L. & Soc. ORD. 191, 195 (1970); Dubey, Confidentiality as a
Requirement of the Therapist- Technical Necessitiesfor Absolute Privilege in Psychotherapy, 131 Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 1093 (1974); Fisher, The PsychotherapeuticProfessions
and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 611 (1964); Fox,
Psychotherapyand Legal Privilege, 53 MAss. L.Q. 307, 315 (1968); Geiser & Rheingold,
Psychology and the Legal Process: Testimonial Privileged Communications, 19 Am.
Privilege: The
PSYCHOLOGIST 831, 836 (1964); Goldstein & Katz, Psychotherapist-Patient
GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN. B.J. 175, 178-79 (1962);
Guttmacher & Weihofen, Privileged Communications Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 28 IND. L.J. 32, 33 (1952); Ladd, Privileges, 1969 L. & Soc. ORDER 555, 581 (1969);
Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World- Part 11,41 MIN. L, REV. 731, 740-45
Privilege,23 MD. L. REV. 39,49 (1963); Slovenko,
(1957); Rappeport, Psychiatrist-Patient
Psychiatryand a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L, REV. 175, 184-203
(1960); Note, FunctionalOverlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implicationsfor the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE LJ. 1226, 1257-58
(1962); Note, Group Therapy and PrivilegedCommunication, 43 IND. LJ.93, 104 (1967);
Note, Privileged Communications- A PsychiatristHas No ConstitutionalRight to Assert an Absolute Privilege Against Disclosure of PsychotherapeuticCommunications,
49 TEx. L. REV. 929, 941 (1971); Note, State Statute to Providea Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege, 4 HAv. J. LEGIs. 307, 314 (1967). As McCormick has stated:
On account of the special therapeutic need for assurance to the patient of
protection against disclosures it is cogently argued... that even in states
not having the physician-patient privilege generally, a privilege should be
recognized, by statute or decision, for confidential disclosures to psychiatrists, qualified psychologists trained in the treatment of mental disorders,
and (in the court's discretion) general practitioners consulted for diagnosis
or treatment of mental disease....
A privilege of those receiving psychotherapy is necessary if the psychiatric profession is to fulfill its medical responsibility to its patients.
C. McCoRMIcK, supra § 9 n.9 at 213.
222. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). McNaughton
argues:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public (in the works sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has
a right to every man's evidence. When we come to examine the various
claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a
general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving and that any
exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule.
The vital process of justice must continue unceasingly. A single cessation
typifies the prostration of society. A series would involve its dissolution.
The pettiness and personality of the individual trial disappear when we reflect that our duty to bear testimony runs not to the parties in that present
cause, but the community at large and forever.
It follows, on the one hand, that all privileges of exemptionfrom the duty
are exceptional, and are therefore to be discountenanced. There must be
good reason, plainly shown, for their existence.
Id. at 70-73.
223. Id. § 2285, at 527.
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Evaluated under these strict criteria, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is justified as advancing the interests of society. The first
two criteria are satisfied because patients generally consider communications in therapy to be confidential, and confidentiality is widely
agreed to be essential to effective treatment. As to the third requirement, society should foster the therapist-patient relationship because effective treatment reduces the costs of antisocial behavior
attributable to mental illness. Finally, though actual measurement is
impossible, the cost to the therapeutic relationship of not having a
society in requiring
privilege is probably greater than the benefit to 224
disclosure of these confidential communications.
Given the wide agreement that the benefits to society of a psychotherapist-patient privilege outweighs its costs, the net benefit of a requirement that the confidences of therapy be revealed in court
appears only de minimis, if not negative. The personal interest in
privacy would therefore considerably outweigh any net benefits to
the state interest. Because the loss of personal rights is so much
greater than the state interest, the compelling state interest doctrine
could not be invoked to justify a broad state rule that compelled the
release of the confidences of therapy every time patient communications were relevant to an issue before a court.
IV.

Whalen, Planned Parenthood,Branzburg,and the
Confidences of Therapy

The Supreme Court has recently decided several cases that seem to
raise doubts about the extent to which the constitutional right of privacy protects the confidences of psychotherapy. In Whalen v. Roe, 225
PlannedParenthoodv. Danforth,?226 and Branzburgv. Hayes,227 it has
permitted state collection of information concerning "dangerous"
drug prescriptions 22 8 and abortions, 229 and has refused to provide a
constitutional privilege for news reporters. 230 A close examination of
these cases, however, reveals that they are only superficially relevant
to the issue of a constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege. The
differences between the issues raised in these cases and the issue of
a psychotherapist-patient privilege include the nature of the information involved, the ability to protect sensitive information from public
view, the harm that will result from a disclosure of the sensitive information, and the practical considerations in administering a privilege.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
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See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 417-18 (Alaska 1976).
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 603-604.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 80.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 690.

The differences are so significant that these cases are -oflimited value
in resolving the question of a constitutional psychotherapist-patient
privilege.
The nature of the information at issue in Whalen and Planned
Parenthoodis fundamentally different from the nature of the information revealed during therapy. In both Whalen and Planned
Parenthood, the Court permitted the state to collect and maintain
medical information about its citizens. 231 Because a state may require the disclosure of some medical data, however, does not mean
that the state may also, without interfering with the right of privacy,
require the disclosure of information from psychotherapy. The subject matter of psychotherapy - emotional concerns and dysfunctions
is generally deemed more private by patients than most medical
afflictions. The information revealed in therapy is likely to be more
intensely personal than general medical information and its release
more harmful to the patient. Because of the more personal and sensitive nature of the confidences of therapy, the release of information
from therapy, even under judicial supervision, threatens the right of
privacy more seriously than the disclosure of information about general medical treatment.
Efforts to control or to limit public access to information disclosed
at trial will be largely unsuccessful. The Supreme Court has emphasized that security provisions to maintain the confidentiality of information might insulate from constitutional attack state actions that
would otherwise offend the right of privacy. The computerized drug
prescription forms in Whalen 232 and the abortion reporting system in
2 33
Planned Parenthood,
for example, included security provisions to
avoid the improper release of medical information. In both cases, the
Court indicated that the absence of security arrangements to preserve the confidentiality of the information would seriously threaten
the privacy of patients and thus would present an entirely different
constitutional question. 234 In Whalen, however, the Court did suggest that states may release some information to the courts under
judicial supervision of the information's evidentiary use.2 3 5 The evidentiary use of the medical information did not seriously threaten
individual privacy, however, because the information was not extremely sensitive, was available from other sources, and was unlikely
to be sought frequently for litigation purposes. 236 By contrast, disclo231. 429 U.S. at 603-604; 428 U.S. at 80.
232. 429 U.S. 589, 601 (1977). The Court approved similar security arrangements in
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. 433 U.S. 425 (1977), which directed an archival
staff with an "unblemished record for discretion" to review the former President's papers and return to him any that were personal Id. at 462-65.
233. 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976). The state claimed two purposes for the requirement that
physicians and health facilities compile data concerning abortions: to preserve maternal health and life by advancing medical knowledge and to monitor abortions to assure
that they were performed in accordance with the law. Id. at 79. The Court held that
"[r] ecordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality and
privacy are permissible." Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
234. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 601; Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81.
235. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 601-602.
236. Id. at 593.
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sure of the confidences of psychotherapy237involves more than a limited release of non-sensitive information.
Whalen, PlannedParenthood, and Branzburg are also distinguishable because the disclosure of information regarding drug prescriptions, abortions, and confidential sources threatens less severe harm
than the disclosure of the confidences of therapy. Although the
Court in Whalen admitted that the state disclosure requirement
might make some patients reluctant to use, and some doctors reluctant to prescribe, certain drugs necessary for health, it held that the
statute did not "pose a sufficiently grievous threat ... to establish a
constitutional violation." 23 8 Noting that the statute provided protection against the release of information on drug use and that the petitioners failed to offer any evidence that the security provisions would
not be administered properly, the Court rejected the claim that the
New York program would interfere with the doctor-patient relationship or with medical treatment.23 9 Similarly, the Court in Planned
Parenthood discounted contentions that maintaining records on
abortions would seriously interfere with the abortion decision or with
the physician-patient relationship. 240 Branzburg also illustrates the
significance the Court attaches to the need to demonstrate harm to
sustain a claim of confidentiality. Despite claims that confidential
news sources would dry up, the Branzburg Court remained unconvinced that the absence of a newsman's privilege would deter informers from furnishing information to reporters. 24 1 Consequently, the
Court held that the alleged harm to the press was insufficient to warrant a news reporter's privilege. 242
Unlike the newsman-informant and physician-patient relationships, the psychotherapist-patient relationship cannot function effectively without confidentiality: "a threat to secrecy blocks successful
treatment."2 43 The opinions of both therapists and potential patients
indicate that the absence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
237. See note 231 supra and accompanying text.
238. 429 U.S. at 600.
239. Id. at 600-604.
240. 428 U.S. at 81.
241. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 693-95. Writing for the Court, Justice White
concluded[T]he evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public [without the privilege]. Estimates
of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants
to make disclosures to newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent
speculative. It would be difficult to canvas the views of the informants
themselves .... [Tlhe relationship of many informants to the press is a

symbiotic one which is unlikely to be greatly inhibited by the threat of subpoena: quite often, such informants are members of a... group that relies
heavily on the media to propagate its views ....

Id.
242. Id.
243. Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Rule 504, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 241,
242 (1972); see notes 161-66 supra and accompanying text.
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would have a serious effect on, and significantly reduce the information exchanged in, therapy. 244 Just as the Branzburg Court regarded
claims by reporters of the need for confidentiality as conflicting and
self-serving,245 some may view similar claims by psychotherapists
with skepticism. The necessity of confidentiality, however, has been
advocated by therapists virtually since the beginning of the profession.246 Unlike the claim for a news reporter's privilege, arguments in
favor of psychotherapist-patient confidentiality did not originate with
an eye toward litigation. A further distinction is that the need for
confidentiality in psychotherapy has been reinforced by the opinions
of potential patients. 247 A final difference between news reporters
and psychotherapists is the tremendous powers of communication
available to reporters to protect themselves, even in the absence of a
privilege. 248 Psychotherapists and their patients, of course, do not
have these powerful mechanisms of communication, or their
equivalent, at their disposal and are thus less able to protect
themselves.
The Court has also expressed concern about how a claimed privilege would work in practice. For example, the Court in Branzburg
feared that the difficulties in determining who would qualify for the
reporter's privilege would be insurmountable. The "lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper" would be as entitled to assert any newsman's privilege as the large metropolitan publisher.249 The Court
chose no privilege at all over one that threatened seriously to hamper
the fair administration of justice.25 0 The practical problems associated with a reporter's privilege, however, would not exist with a psychotherapist-patient privilege. As a practical matter, a therapistpatient privilege would be considerably easier to administer because
licensing statutes and educational requirements define categories of
251
therapists to whom the privileges might apply.
The policy and practical differences between the psychotherapistpatient relationship, on the one hand, and the newsman-informant
and physician-patient relationships, on the other, are significant. In
adopting the proposed rules of evidence, the Supreme Court apparently recognized these differences because the rules provided for a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, but not a news reporter's privilege
244. See notes 161-66 supra and accompanying text.
245. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 693-94. The Court observed: "[Slurveys of reporters on this topic are chiefly opinions of predicted informant behavior and must be
viewed in of the professional self-interest of the interviewees." Id. at 694.
246. The view that confidentiality is necessary to successful psychotherapy has
been traced to Freud. 2 S. FREUD, COLLECTED PAPERS 356, 357-58 (Am. rev. ed. 1959). See
generally Slovenko, Psychotherapist-PatientTestimoniri Privilege: A Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. U. L. REv. 649 (1974); notes 161-66 supra.
247. See note 163 supra.
248. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 706 ("there is much force in the pragmatic view
that the press has at its disposal powerful mechanisms of communication and is far
from helpless to protect itself from harassment or substantial harm").
249. Id. at 704.
250. Id. at 703-704.
251. The categories of therapists who might be covered by such a privilege are considered at notes 270-74 infra and accompanying text.
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or a physician-patient privilege. 252 Despite congressional rejection of
the Court's proposed psychotherapist-patient privilege, the need for
a privilege still remains. The most secure basis for a psychotherapist-patient privilege is in the constitutional right of privacy. Courts,
however, may be reluctant to interpret that right broadly to include
protection of confidential psychotherapeutic communications, at
least absent further encouragement by the Supreme Court. As an
alternative, they may instead rely upon their inherent common law
power to devise the protection necessary to foster effective
psychotherapy.

V. The Common Law Alternative
Courts faced with claims for a constitutionally based psychotherapist-patient privilege might avoid the constitutional question by establishing some form of common law privilege. 2 53 Traditionally, few
privileges were recognized by the common law, with the attorney-client privilege being the most notable of the "professional" privileges.
Because privileges deprive litigants of material evidence, courts have
been reluctant to expand the scope of testimonial privileges, have
often construed statutory privileges narrowly, 25 4 and have been most
reluctant to recognize new privileges. 255 Other than this traditional
hostility toward privileges, however, no substantive rule of law bars
the judiciary from establishing common law privileges in appropriate
252. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
253. See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 418 (Alaska 1976) (holding that psychotherapist-patient communications are protected by a common law privilege). A lower court
in Illinois 24 years prior to Allred also recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52C2535 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Illinois June 24, 1952) (cited in
Note, Confidential Communications to a Psychotherapist: A New Testimonial Privilege, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 384, 384-85 (1952)); see Note, A State Statute to Provide a Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 4 HARv.J. LEG. 307, 313 (1967).
254. See, e.g., Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067 (1976); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70, (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (citing a number of cases that have
narrowly construed statutory privileges); C. DEW~rr, PRIVILEGED COMMrUNMCAToNs BETWEEN PHYsiciA AND PA=INT 67-69 (1958) (same). Recently, however, several courts
have construed statutory privileges more liberally to enhance the legislative purpose
of protecting certain relationships. See id. at 69-72. See generally Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (1976); Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330, 508 P.2d 309, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 309 (1973); Howard v. Porter, 240 Iowa 153, 35 N.W.2d 837 (1949).
255. See C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 77, at 156 (E. Cleary rev. 2d ed. 1972). One reason for the reluctance of courts to recognize new privileges may be their general distaste for privileges. In addition, courts and commentators disagree as to whether
privileges are substantive or procedural. See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 415-16,
(Alaska 1976); id. at 423 (Boochever, C.J., concurring); Emery, Rules of Evidence and
the FederalPractice: Limits on the Supreme Court'sRulemaking Power,1974 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 77, 78-79; Schwartz, Privileges Under the FederalRules of Evidence - A Step Forward?,38 U. Prrr. L. REV. 79,81 (1976); Note, Erie,Privilegesand the ProposedRules of
Evidence: Confusion, 10 NEW ENG. L.REV. 399,406-13 (1975). If privileges are classified
as substantive law, the authority of the courts to adopt new privileges is necessarily
circumscribed.
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circumstances. 2 56 Because the operation of a privilege primarily affects the work of the judiciary, courts would be justified in establishing a common law privilege when public policy warrants protection of
particular communications, even in the absence of specific statutory
authority.
One state court, for example, has recently established a common
law psychotherapist-patient privilege. In Allred v. State,2 57 the
Supreme Court of Alaska relied upon its inherent common law authority, as an alternative to the constitutional right of privacy, to protect confidential psychotherapist-patient communications. 258 The
privilege question arose when a murder suspect confessed to a social
worker, who was associated with a psychiatrist, that he had committed the murder.25 9 The trial court ordered the social worker to testify
regarding her conversations with the defendant.2 60 The Supreme
Court of Alaska first found that no statutory provision protected the
confidentiality of the communications between a psychotherapist
and his patient.26 1 After reviewing the history of common law privileges, the court concluded that although modern recognition of common law privileges is relatively rare, 2 62 a common law
psychotherapist-patient privilege was justified on the basis of the
Wigmore criteria. 263 The Alaska court apparently concluded that if
256. Even if state courts consider privileges substantive, they might still establish a
privilege when necessary to protect important confidential relationships.
257. 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
258. Id. at 418. Another alternative, of course, is for the legislature to enact a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Because the judiciary is the branch of government that,
absent a privilege, would compel disclosure of the confidences of therapy, however, the
judiciary may properly consider the adoption of the privilege without a statutory
mandate.
259. Id. at 413.
260. Id. Allred was taken into custody at the Langdon Psychiatric Clinic by the
Anchorage police. While in custody, Allred asked to see Dr. Wolf, a psychiatrist, or
Shirley Henderson, a social worker described by the court as "a drug program coordinator and a counselor to petitioner." Id. Allowed by the court to testify, Ms. Henderson stated that Alfred told her that he and the deceased (Paul O'Keefe) had been
drinking and taking drugs and that they had been discussing a suicide pact. She
continued:
[Allred] told me that he had blacked out or passed out and was awakened
by Paul, who was crying and begging him and saying, if you are my friend
you will kill me - please, and he - with tears in his eyes- ahh - and
begging [Alired]. [Allred] told me that he had a gun and that he did shoot
Paul, and that Paul laid on the floor and was jerking and moving and that he
hit him with the gun but that he still didn't stop moving, and that this was
his friend and he was doing this for his friend because they were such good
friends, and that he picked Paul up and put him in the bath tub and turned
the water on until Paul stopped moving.
Id.
261. Id. at 415-16.
262. Id. at 416. As examples of recently established common law privileges, the
court cited Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Fahy, J., concurring) and Cook v. Carrol, [1945] Ir. R. 515, 521 (High Ct.) (excerpted in 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2394, at 87 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)), which followed common law
priest-penitent privileges. The Allred court also cited McTaggart v. McTaggart, [1948]
2 All E.R. Reprint 754, 755 (Ct. App.), as an example of the English judicial doctrine of
"conversation without prejudice," which protects statements made to marriage counselors attempting to effectuate reconciliation, and In re Kryschuk and Zulynik, 14
D.L.R.2d 676, 678 (Sask. Magist. Ct. 1958), which established a similar Canadian
doctrine.
263. See 554 P.2d at 418; note 223 supra and accompanying text (discussing the Wigmore criteria). Applying these criteria to Allred, the court concluded:
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the Wigmore criteria were met, nothing additional 2was
needed to jus64
tify the establishment of a common law privilege.
Federal courts may have congressional authority to recognize common law privileges. When Congress removed the enumerated privileges from the rules of evidence proposed by the Supreme Court, it
substituted a general rule under. which, in federal cases, 265 common
law privileges would apply "as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience. 2 66 By refusing to adopt the rules as proposed by the Supreme Court, Congress did not intend to repudiate the specific privileges contained in
the rules. 267 The power to interpret the common law regarding privileges in light of reason and experience
apparently empowers the fed268
eral courts to adopt new privileges.
First, communications to a psychotherapist in the course of therapy are inherently confidential. Patients often make statements in psychotherapy
which they would not make to even the closest members of their families.... Second, inviolability of the confidences is essential to achievement of the psychotherapeutic goal. . . Without the patient's confidence a
psychiatrist's efforts are worthless ... Third, the relationship between psychotherapist and patient is unquestionably one which should be fostered .... Finally, in balancing injury to the relation, by fear of disclosure,
against the benefit to justice by compelling disclosure, the scales weigh
heavily in favor of confidentiality.... Reason indicates that the absence of
a privilege would make it doubtful whether either psychotherapists or their
patients could communicate effectively if it were thought that what they
said could be disclosed compulsorily in a court of law.
Id. at 417-18.
264. The court could not agree on whether the privilege was broad enough to cover
communications to a social worker, as opposed to a psychotherapist. Two justices argued that communications to social workers were not covered by the common law privilege, id. at 418 (Connor &Erwin, JJ., concurring in part); two were of the opinion that
they were covered by the privilege because a therapeutic relationship was established
and because the social worker was the psychiatrist's "alter ego" in this case, id. at 42526 (Rabinowitz &Diamond, JJ., concurring); the chief justice found that the communications between Allred and the social worker were protected by statute, id. at 422
(Boochever, C.J., concurring). See notes 270-75 infra and accompanying text.
265. "Federal cases" are those criminal and civil cases in which state law does not
supply the rule of decision. See FED. R. Evm. 501. For the most part, federal privilege
law applies in nondiversity cases.
266. Id.
267. See 10 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 501.02, at 19-20 (2d ed. 1979). The Senate
Report to new federal rules stated:
The committee has received a considerable volume of correspondence from
psychiatric organizations and psychiatrists concerning the deletion of rule
504 of the rule submitted by the Supreme Court. It should be clearly understood that, in approving this general rule as to privileges, the action of Congress should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a
psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or any other of the enumerated privileges contained in the Supreme Court rules. Rather, our action should be
understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based
on a confidential relationship and other privileges should be determined on
a case-by-case basis.
S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEws 7051, 7059.
268. See 10 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 501.04, at 23 (2d ed. 1979). Professor

Moore observes:
Ironically, Congressional deferral to judicial development of privileges on
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Recognition of a common law psychotherapist-patient privilege,
however, would not completely avoid the constitutional question. A
federal common law privilege would not apply in state courts or in
diversity actions in federal court. Because the absence of the privilege in those cases would still be open to constitutional challenge, the
most desirable basis for the privilege remains the constitutional right
of privacy.

VI.

The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege

Whether adopted as part of the common law or as a matter of constitutional interpretation, the scope of a judicially established psychotherapist-privilege should be reasonably clear. Precision regarding
the applicability of the privilege is desirable because uncertainty
tends to create concern among patients that the privilege will not
protect their confidences. Patient concern, in turn, reduces the effectiveness of the privilege by discouraging openness in therapy. To
avoid effectively destroying the privilege, therefore, the coverage of
the privilege should be clear and its exceptions must be strictly
269
limited.
federal issues may result in the application of most of the Court Rules on
privileges. When, for example, a district judge is faced with a complex and
confusing question of a privilege for state secrets, he may reasonably turn
to the Court draft for guidance. This, in our opinion, should be done in all
types of cases for.. . the Court's rules and the accompanying notes are, at
the least, a great source of information and guidance.
As to federal issues the statutory rule is open ended. Subject to the exceptions of Rule 501, what privileges are to be applied depends upon the
enlightened principles of common law... [U]nder this developmental approach, a federal court, for example, can by judicial decision modify or eliminate a generally accepted privilege or create and recognize a new privilege
such as a reporter's privilege. [In contrast,] the Court's [proposed] rules, if
they were in effect, provide certain privileges, which would be controlling in
a case until the rules were amended. [Under these circumstances,] the creation of a new privilege would have to be by amendment of the rules and
not by a common law development through judicial decision. The Court's
rules do not contemplate any common law development, as does the first
half of statutory Rule 501 dealing with federal issues.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980); 38
U. Prrr. L. REv. 79, 84-86 (1976). The Supreme Court cannot unilaterally modify the
Federal Rules of Evidence without the consent of Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976).
269. See Slovenko, Psychotherapist-PatientTestimonial Privilege: A Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 CATE. U.L. REv. 649, 649 (1974). Professor Slovenko argues that judicial exceptions to statutory psychotherapist-patient privileges have so weakened the
privilege that proponents of the privilege have been "false prophets":
The hope in privilege was misguided... Exceptions, purportediy designed
to achieve balance, have been carved into the psychotherapy privilege,
where it exists, leaving little or no shield cover - very much resembling a
payroll statement where most or all of the pay has been deducted at the
source... In every jurisdiction, the exceptions and implied waivers are so
many and so broad that it is difficult to imagine a case in which the privilege
applies.
Id. at 649-56.
A psychotherapist-patient privilege need not be a "misguided hope." If the constitutional right of privacy is to protect the confidences of therapy effectively, exceptions to
the privilege must be narrow and limited. Only if exceptions and implied waivers are
strictly limited will the privilege provide real protection for the patients of
pyschotherapy.
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Coverage of the Privilege
The kinds of communications within the scope of a psychotherapistpatient privilege should be clearly understood, by patients and therapists alike. An effective privilege should assure patients in advance
that their discussions will be held in confidence by the therapist. To
provide certainty in the application of the privilege, some generalizations should be made concerning the necessity of confidentiality for
various kinds of therapy. As a general proposition, the privilege
should only extend to therapy that requires a deep, searching inquiry
into the personality and life of the patient. Only this kind of therapy
truly needs the protection of a privilege to promote the patient's complete candor. Psychotherapy easily satisfies this criterion because
the therapist probes the innermost psyche of his patients. Without
an assurance of confidentiality, the patient might hesitate to divulge
extremely sensitive information, information that might be essential
to the effectiveness of the therapy. Whether other kinds of therapy
warrant the protection afforded by a privilege, however, would depend upon the nature of the communication between therapist and
patient. The more intimate the patient's revelations, the more justifiable the extension of the privilege to cover those communications.
Defining the kind of therapy that necessitates confidentiality does
not adequately narrow the scope of the privilege. Those therapists
who may legitimately guarantee confidentiality to their patients must
be limited in some reasonable manner. Obviously, not everyone is
qualified to conduct therapy that necessitates a deep exploration of a
patient's mind and background. Otherwise, a privilege covering therapy or counseling could conceivably be interpreted to include communication not only to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists, but
2 70
also to social workers, marriage therapists, counselors of all kinds,
and, ultimately, the corner bartender who informally assumes the
role of therapist or counselor. 271 A privilege so broad, of course,
would be unsatisfactory: too much relevant evidence would be excluded from the courts. The most satisfactory solution, at least ini270. Self-improvement group therapies or growth therapies of various kinds are
available today. Some may provide at least some benefit to those who participate,
others may be harmful. See M. GRoss, THE PsYcHOLoGIcAL SociETY 277-317 (1978);
Glass, Kirsh & Parris, Psychiatric Disturbances Associated with Erhard Seminars
Training: A Report of Cases, 134 Am. J. PsYcHIATRY 245, 245 (1977); Keen, Deliver Us
From Shyness Clinics, 11 PYSCHOLOGY TODAY 18 (Mar. 1978); Shostrom, Group Therapy: Let the Buyer Beware, in CuNicAL PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 149,150-51 (B. Henker ed.
1967); Yalom & Leiberman, A Study of Encounter Group Casualties,25 ARcHIvEs GEN.
PyscmATRY 16,28-29 (1971). See generally Hogan, Encounter Groupsand Human Relations Training: The Case Against Applying Traditional Forms of Statutory Regulation, 11 HARv. J. LEGIS. 659 (1974).
271. Bartenders recognize the counseling role they may play. One sign posted by a
bartender-counselor reads: "Need help? Don't visit a psychiatrist - See your bartender instead. He's more available, he's cheaper and he'll never tell you to quit

drinking."
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tially, is to limit the privilege to the patients of psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists. This alternative would not only limit the scope
of the privilege in a reasonable manner, but also minimize the practical problems in determining the applicability of the privilege to various patient-therapist relationships. Most jurisdictions already
distinguish psychiatrists and psychologists from other therapists or
counselors, primarily by requiring that they be licensed and certified. 272 Because of their training, psychologists and psychiatrists are
also more likely to be qualified to engage in psychotherapy and other
kinds of treatment that explore the most personal aspects of a patient's personality and life.273 As the Alaska Supreme Court observed in Allred: "Counseling [as opposed to therapy] either does
not, or should not, have as its aim a deep penetration into the psychic
processes of the patient or client. The need for a privilege to foster
the counselor-client relationship is, correspondingly, less readily apparent. ' 274 Until further study demonstrates the need to extend the
privilege to other mental health professions, therefore, the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be limited to communications be275
tween psychiatrists and licensed psychotherapists.
272. "Psychiatrists" may be more difficult to identify because they may be licensed
as medical doctors but not specifically as psychiatrists. In jurisdictions where psychiatrists are not specially certified, or where certification does not include substantially
all the physicians practicing psychotherapy, a jurisdiction could, in accordance with
the Rules of Evidence proposed by the Supreme Court, include persons reasonably
believed to be medical doctors, "while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a
mental or emotional condition." Proposed Rule 504(a) (2), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183,
240 (1972). Alternatively, a psychiatrist might be recognized to include a medical doctor reasonably believed by the patient to devote a substantial portion of his time to the
practice of psychiatry. Id.
273. See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 418-20 (1976). At least part of the Alaska
Supreme Court recognized the distinction between psychiatrists and psychologists, on
the one hand, and counselors and social workers, on the other
Counseling is aimed not primarily at uncovering deep psychological
processes but at enabling the client to make more effective use of his present resources. Counseling includes vocational, educational, employee, rehabilitation, marriage, and personal guidance within its spheres of
operation ....
[Clounseling is considerably more superficial and less
searching than what we understand to be included within the term
"psychotherapy."
Id. at 419. Although part of the opinion of the court in Allred, this portion of the opinion was supported only by Justice O'Connor and Justice Erwin.
274. Id. at 419. The court acknowledged that clients of counselors may reveal degrading facts about themselves:
Such revelations are more in the nature of an unintended byproduct of the
counseling activity. Such utterances are neither essential nor necessary to
the successful realization of the counseling goal. There may be instances in
which counselors attempt to uncover the intimate, personal secrets of their
clients, but we do not view such activity to be essential or proper to the
counseling function."
Id.
275. Some commentators have suggested that the privilege should include social
workers or some counselors. See, e.g., Logatto, PrivilegedCommunicationand the Social Worker, 8 CATI. LAw. 5, 5 (1962); Reynolds, Threats to Confidentiality, 21 J. NAT'L
A. Soc. WORKERS 108 (1976); Robinson, Testimonial Privilege and the School Guidance
Counselor, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 911, 917 (1974); Slovenko, Psychotherapist-PatientTestimonial Privilege:A Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 CAm. U. I REv. 649, 664 (1974);
Note, Underprivileged Communications: Extention of the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege to Patients of PsychiatricSocial Workers, 61 CALIF. L REv. 1050, 1050 (1973);
Note, Testimonial Privileges and the Student-Counselor Relationship in Secondary
Schools, 56 IowA L. REv. 1323, 1324 (1971); Note, The Social Worker-Client Relationship
and Privileged Communications, 1965 WASH. U. L.Q. 362, 362. Whether communica-
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Applicability to Group Therapy
Group therapy poses special problems in determining the applicability of the psychotherapist-patient privilege because of the presence
of parties besides the therapist and the patient. This kind of therapy
involves one or more third parties who, though they may be active to

varying degrees in each other's therapy, are present primarily for diagnosis and treatment of their own conditions. The presence of third
parties has traditionally destroyed a privilege unless those parties
27 6
were acting as necessary assistants to the professional.
Despite the presence of third parties, group therapy should also be
included within a constitutional or common law privilege. Even
though one or more third parties may be present during therapy, the
patients often expect the confidentiality of the discussions of the
group to be maintained by the members of the group as well as by the
therapist. Indeed, the therapist often cautions group participants
that confidentiality is mandatory. Because group therapy is an effective form of treatment,277 with the special advantage that several pations between these professionals and their clients would generally be of such a pri-

vate nature that they would be covered by a constitutional privilege is unclear. In
addition, expanding the privilege to include these people would significantly increase
the cost of the privilege by keeping from the courts a considerable amount of relevant
testimony without clearly offering a corresponding societal benefit.
One commentator has suggested that a privilege limited to psychologists and psychiatrists would be unconstitutional, violating both the right of privacy and the equal protection clause. Comment, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege: Are Some Patients
More Privilegedthan Others?, 10 PAC. L.J. 801, 808-814, 814-818 (1979). The author suggested that the definition of psychotherapist include anyone "who, in the course of his
or her regular profession or employment, may be expected to practice psychotherapy,"
such as psychiatrists; psychologists; licensed workers; school psychologists; educational psychologists; marriage, family, and child counselors; government employed
psychiatric social workers; and school counselors with credentials. Id. at 820. One difficulty with this approach is determining with certainty what constitutes, and therefore
who practices, "psychotherapy."
276. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); United States v. Lustig, 555
F.2d 737, 748 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1972); In
re Bretto, 231 F. Supp. 529, 530 (D. Minn. 1964); Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 173
(1859); People v. Simpson, 68 IlL 2d 276, 280, 369 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (1977); Kansas v.
Glover, 219 Kan. 54, 58, 547 P.2d 351, 355 (1976); Ellis v. Ellis, 63 Tenn. App. 361, 370, 472
S.W.2d 741, 744-45 (1971); 8 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2311, 2326, at 599, 603 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participantsin Group
Psychotherapy, 1970 L. & Soc. ORDER 191, 193-94; Morgan, Must the Group Get Up and
Testify? An Examination of Group Therapy Privilege, 2 GROUP 67, 70-73 (1978); Note,
Group Therapy and Privileged Communication, 43 IND. LJ. 93, 98-100 (1967). For discussions of the effect of third parties on the applicability of the attorney-client privilege, see Note, Legal Professional Privilege and Third Parties, 37 MOD. L.REV. 601
(1974); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilegein Multiple Party Situations, 8 COLuM. J. L.
&Soc. PRoB. 179 (1972); Note, PrivilegedCommunicationsin Divorce Actions: Psychiatrist-Patientand the Presenceof Third Parties,40 TENN.L. REV. 110 (1972).
The presence of third parties may effectively destroy the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in two ways: the privilege may be lost altogether, so that the patient, the therapist (or other professional), or the third party may be required to testify about the
communications; or the privilege may be retained, but not prevent the third party from
being required to testify about the communications.
277. See generally A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION (1969); J.
MELTZOFF & M. KORNREICH, RESEARCH IN PSYCHOTHERAPY (1970); 0. MOWEER, THE
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tients can be treated by the therapist at the same time, the courts
should extend to it the benefits of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. To be effective, however, a group therapy privilege would have
to protect the patient-patient communications within the group as
well as psychotherapist-patient communications.
Waiver
Because a privilege ordinarily belongs to a patient or client, generally
only the patient or client could waive it. Some scholars have suggested, however, that in the case of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the patient may not be able to understand the nature of the
disclosures that would be made if the privilege were waived, or may
not appreciate the effect of any disclosure on his own psyche. 278 As a
result, some argue, the doctor rather than the patient, or the doctor in
addition to the patient, should have to waive the privilege before the
2 79
waiver is effective.
These arguments are insufficient to modify the general rules regarding waiver solely because of a psychotherapist-patient constitutional or common law privilege. 280 Though incompetent patients
may, of course, be prevented from waiving rights or entering into enforceable agreements, the possibility that waiver of a privilege may
do more harm than good has never been thought to be sufficient reason to prevent a competent person from waiving rights. As an additional safeguard, a psychotherapist should explain the consequences
of a waiver to the patient if the dangers of a waiver are significant.
Patient-LitigantException
A patient who brings his own mental condition into question in litigation is generally deemed to have waived any psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 28 1 The California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit,
both of which recognize a constitutional psychotherapist-patient
privilege, have indicated that the privilege is not absolute and may be
implicitly waived by patients when they bring their mental condiNEW GROUP THERAPY (1964); Shostrom, Group Therapy: Let the Buyer Beware, in
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 149-51 (B. Henker ed. 1967); Allgeyer, Using Groupsin a
Crisis-OrientedOut-PatientSetting, 23 INT'L J. GRouP THERAPY 217 (1973); Cadagam,
Marital Group Therapy in the Treatment of Alcoholism 34 Q.J. STUD. ALCOHOL 1187
(1973); Rogers, InterpersonalRelationship: Year 2000, 4 J. APPLIED BEHAvioRAL Sc.
265 (1968).
278. See Slawson, Patient-LitigantException: A Hazardto Psychotherapy,21 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCH. 347, 351 (1969); Suarez & Hunt, The Patient-LitigantException in Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege Cases: New Considerationsfor Alaska and California
Since In re Lifschutz, 1 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REV. 1, 15-19 (1971).
279. See note 278 supra. The courts in Caesar and Lifschutz rejected similar
claims. 542 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); 2 Cal. 3d 415,
421-26, 467 P.2d 557, 560-64, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832-35 (1960); see 49 TEx. L. REv. 929, 937-41
(1971). See generally Fisher, The PsychotherapeuticProfessionsand the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609 (1964).
280. It may well be desirable to limit by law what amounts to involuntary waivers
required as part of the payment by a third party for psychotherapeutic services. See
generally PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE REPORT OF THE PR;VACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION 278-317 (1972).

281. See notes 19-32, 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
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tions into issue.2 82 This patient-litigant exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege means the patient faces the unhappy choice of
abandoning either a valid claim or defense, or the confidentiality of
therapy.
Even if they hold that a patient-litigant waives his privilege, however, trial courts can do much to reduce the intrusion into the patient's privacy and thereby to minimize the adverse consequences of
his choice. The California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, as
noted earlier, instruct trial courts to limit inquiries into the confi283
dences of therapy as narrowly as possible to fulfill this mandate.
Trial courts should interpret an implicit waiver to apply only to those
mental conditions or defects that are directly relevant to the suit.
Courts may further limit the adverse effects of a waiver by examining
questionable evidence in camera and refusing to admit inflammatory
to the proponent
or other psychotherapeutic evidence if the 2benefit
84
does not outweigh the harm to the patient.
Future Crime and Dangerousness
Information concerning the commission of future crimes is generally
not included within the scope of a testimonial privilege. 2 85 The constitutional basis for a dangerous future crime exception to a constitutional psychotherapist-patient privilege is the compelling state
interest in preventing death and serious physical injuries - a state
interest "of the highest order. '286 By obtaining information about a
"future crime" the state, forewarned, can take steps to prevent the
crime. The state's interest, however, will vary depending on the nature of the information sought. After the commission of a crime, for
example, the state's interest in obtaining what amounts to a confession to the therapist is weaker because it can do nothing at that point
to prevent the commission of the crime.
282. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 427, 467 P.2d 557, 564, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (1970);
Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
283. See notes 29-32, 51-57 supra and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 437-38, 467 P.2d 557, 572-73, 85 Cal. Rptr.
829, 844-45 (1970). Courts should also use the limitations on the patient-litigant exception proposed by Judge Hufstedler to avoid unnecessary invasions of privacy. They
should limit the inquiry to the time, length, cost, and ultimate diagnosis of treatment.
A party would be able to obtain additional information only if he demonstrated a compelling need for it. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d at 1075 (Hufstedler, J. concurring and
dissenting).
Whether or not a psychotherapist-patient privilege is recognized, strict application
of relevancy and materiality rules may significantly protect the confidences of therapy.
See Slovenko, Psychotherapist-PatientTestimonial Privilege: A Picture of Misguided
Hope, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 649, 657-79 (1974).
285. See generally Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to Communications
Privilege - A Need
Privileges,77 HARv. L. REV. 730 (1964); Note, Psychiatrist-Patient
for the Retention of the Future Crime Exception, 52 IOWA L. REV. 1170 (1967).
286. McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F.Supp. 1355, 1381 (D.N.J. 1978); see Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 440-42, 551 P.2d 334, 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr.14, 26-27 (1976).
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The efficacy of a "future dangerous crime" exception to a psychotherapist-patient privilege as a means of screening dangerous patients is difficult to assess. Theoretically, therapists should be better
able than most persons to determine when a patient is likely to be
dangerous and therefore should be in a better position to warn potential victims. At the same time, therapists are theoretically more
likely than others to be able to use their skills to dissuade the patient
from the violence or crime. If confidentiality is essential for effective
therapy, an actual or even potential breach of confidentiality can interfere with the therapy and reduce the chance that the therapist can
convince the patient to forego criminal or antisocial conduct. California, the first jurisdiction to recognize the existence of a constitutional
right to a psychotherapist-patient privilege, has considered the constitutional and competing social policy claims regarding the need to
protect the confidentiality of communications about imminent, dangerous activity. 287 In Tarasoff,the California Supreme Court decided
that the therapist has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect potential victims from a patient's dangerous proclivities. 28 8 The duty
attaches when the therapist knows or should know, that the patient
is likely to be dangerous. 289 That duty may require the therapist to
breach the confidences of the patient.
The constitutionality of the dangerousness exception to the privilege is dependent upon two assumptions: (1) that therapists can predict dangerousness with reasonable accuracy, and (2) that by
compelling therapists to breach the confidences of patients to protect
potential victims, the state will induce a net reduction in the number
of violent attacks by mental patients. The validity of both assumptions, however, is questionable. 290 And if either of the two assump287. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 440-41, 551
P.2d 334, 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26-27 (1976).
288. Id. at 439-40, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
289. Id.
290. Several commentators have challenged the assumption that psychotherapists
can predict the dangerousness of patients accurately. See Albers, Pasewark, & Meyer,
Involuntary Hospitalizationand PsychiatricTestimony: The Fallibilityof the Doctrine
of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP.U. L. REV. 11, 22-28 (1976); Cocozza & Steadman, The
Failureof PsychiatricPredictionsof Dangerousness: Clearand Convincing Evidence,
29 RUT.L. REV. 1084 (1976); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatryand the Presumptionof Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 711-16 (1974); Kozol,
Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness,18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 371, 383 (1972). See generally J. ZISKIN, COPING WrrH PSYCmATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TEsTImoNY (1975).
In addition, some legal scholars have argued that the psychotherapist's warnings to
potential victims of violence will increase, not decrease, injuries and deaths by discouraging dangerous people from obtaining psychotherapy. See, e.g., Stone, The
TarasoffDecisions: Suing Psychotherapiststo Safeguard Society, 90 HARv. L. REV. 358,
370-71 (1976); Note, The DangerousPatientException and the Duty to Warn: Creation
of a DangerousPrecedent?, 9 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 549, 566 (1976). But see Fleming &
Maximov, The Patientof His Victim: The Therapist'sDilemma, 62 CALnF. L. REV. 1025,
1038-40 (1974).
Because state-required warnings to potential victims may involve a significant
breach of the confidences of therapy, courts must determine whether the warnings to
potential victims in fact promote the state interest in preventing death and injuries.
One survey indicated that within one year after Tarasoff, one-fourth of the therapists
surveyed indicated that they observed the reluctance of some patients to discuss their
violent tendencies when informed of the "duty to warn." These therapists also reported more frequent breaches of confidentiality following Tarasoff (though many had
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tions upon which it is premised proves invalid, the dangerousness
exception to the privilege would not promote a compelling state
interest.
CriminalDefense Exception
A psychotherapist-patient privilege may interfere with the sixth
amendment rights of criminal defendants. The sixth amendment
grants defendants in criminal trials the right to confront adverse witnesses and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
their favor.2 91 A defendant's ability to present an adequate defense
to charges in a criminal case may require information that is protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege of a third party. The
defendant may need this information to impeach a witness who has
testified for the prosecution or to establish a defense to the charge.
For example, he might wish to present evidence that an adverse witness made statements to a therapist that were inconsistent with the
testimony of the witness at trial, or that a patient confessed to a therapist the crime with which the defendant is charged. By limiting the
opportunity to question witnesses about the confidences of therapy, a
psychotherapist-patient privilege might interfere with the ability of a
defendant to obtain or present this evidence to the court and thus
might constitute a violation of the sixth amendment.
Until recently, sixth amendment rights clearly did not destroy privileges established by statute.2 92 During the last two decades, however, courts have expanded the "confrontation" and "compulsory
process" rights of criminal defendants.2 93 Today, the extent to which
these sixth amendment rights override statutory privileges is largely
undefined. In Davis v. Alaska,294 the Supreme Court held that a
state ban on the use of juvenile records for impeachment purposes
was unconstitutional when those records were crucial to the defense
in a criminal case.295 The Davis decision has prompted some courts
warned potential victims even before Tarasoff). Note, Where the Public PerilBegins: A
Survey of Psychotherapiststo Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L REV. 165,
182-86 (1978).
291. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment reads in part: "In all criminal
prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; [and]to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor
292. See generally,8 J. WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2191, at 69 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
293. See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). See generally Clinton, The Right to
Presenta Defense: An Emergent ConstitutionalGuaranteein CriminalTrials, 9 IND. L.
REV. 713 (1976); Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation,119 U. PA. L.
REV. 711 (1971); Westen, Confrontationand Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of
Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 I-HRv. L. REV. 569 (1978); Note, ConstitutionalRestraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's.Favor: The Implications of
Davis v. Alaska, 73 MIc. L. REv. 1465 (1975).
294. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
295. Id. at 319-20.
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to hold that the rights of confrontation and of compulsory process
compel the disclosure of evidence otherwise protected by statutory
evidentiary privileges. 296 These courts, however, may have read Davis too broadly.29 7 The Supreme Court has not indicated that statutory privileges are constititutionally required to yield in all cases to
298
sixth amendment rights.
To the extent that a psychotherapist-patient privilege is based on
the constitutional right of privacy, it would be less vulnerable to sixth
amendment challenges than a similar statutory privilege. 299 A privilege with consitutional dimensions would generally not yield to sixth
amendment attacks. The privilege against self-incrimination, for example, would not be destroyed upon a demand by a criminal defendant for information protected by that privilege. Under limited
circumstances, however, a state might be justified in adopting a rule
permitting criminal defendants to obtain some information regarding
the confidences of therapy. The state would have to establish a compelling interest in resolving the conflict between the sixth amendment rights of the defendant and the constitutional right of privacy of
others. 3 00
Even if adopted as a matter of sixth amendment right or as a legislative judgment, any criminal defense incursion on the constitutional
right of privacy should be subject to the limitations on the compelling
state interest doctrine. 301 For example, before a court orders disclosure of the confidences of therapy, the evidence sought by the defendant must appear to be important to the defense and must not be
available from other sources.3 0 2 Courts might also use protective orders and in camera inspection of evidence to avoid unnecessary invasions of privacy. A court should order disclosure only upon a
determination that the harm engendered by disclosing confidential
patient communications is outweighed by the benefit to the defendant of obtaining the information.3 03 Moreover, the court must not
296. See Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66, 79 (Alaska 1976); State v. Hembd, 305 Minn.
120, 126, 232 N.W.2d 872, 876 (1975); State v. Roma, 140 N.J. Super. 582, 588,357 A.2d 45, 51,
affd on reargumen4 143 N.J. Super. 504, 363 A.2d 923 (1976).
297. Some courts have gone so far as to use Davis to expand the power of prosecutors by allowing them to violate witnesses' privileges. See Bellew v. Gunn, 424 F. Supp.
31, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1976); State v. Wilkins, 215 Kan. 145, 148-49, 523 P.2d 728, 732 (1974).
298. See generally Hill, TestimonialPrivilege and Fair2rial, 80 COLJM. L. REV. 1173,
1178-81 (1980); Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontationand Compulsory
ProcessRights Against Statutory CommunicationsPrivileges,30 STAN. L REV. 935, 95871 (1978).
299. See generally Note, State v. Looney: Defendants' Need for OrderedPsychiatric
Evaluationsof Witnesses' Credibility Outweighted by Witnesses's Right to Privacy,57
N.C. L. REv. 448 (1979).
300. Resolving legitimate conflicts between competing constitutional rights is a
state interest that has been considered "compelling." See note 196 supra.
301. See notes 191-216 supra and accompanying text.
302. See United States v. Ehrlichman, 389 F. Supp. 95, 97 (D.D.C. 1974); People v.
Bridgeforth, 51 Ill. 2d 52, 57, 281 N.E.2d 617, 662, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 811 (1972);
State v. Walters, 528 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
303. The Supreme Court has suggested in a number of cases that courts should
examine the policies underlying a testimonial privilege to determine whether sixth
amendment interests are sufflciently strong to justify invading the privilege. See, e.g.,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-13 (1974); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320
(1974); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967).
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compel disclosure if the information can be obtained through other
means less intrusive of the patient's privacy. If the information from
therapy is important to a successful defense, a court might order the
state to narrow or modify its case to remove the defendant's need for
the information. For example, it might direct a state not to use certain evidence in a criminal trial so that the defendant does not require confidential psychotherapeutic information to refute the state's
evidence. In some cases, a court might even order a state to dismiss
charges against a defendant to avoid creating a situation in which
continuation of the case would inevitably cause either a violation of
the defendant's sixth amendment rights or a violation of the right of
privacy of a third party.30 4 The imposition of these kinds of limitations is analogous to the responsibility of the state to offer limited
3 05
immunity to a witness necessary to the defense.
Given the minimal constraints the Supreme Court placed on statutory privileges in Davis, the additional protection expected to accompany a constitutionally-based privilege, and the Court's failure to
recognize any explicit criminal defense exception in its proposed
rules of evidence, any criminal defense exception to a constitutionally based psychotherapist-patient privilege would probably be quite
limited.
Court Ordered Examinationsand Civil Commitment Exceptions
Statutory psychotherapist-patient privileges often exclude from their
protection the results of psychiatric or psychological testing conducted pursuant to a court order and communications relevant to involuntary civil commitment when the therapist has determined that
the patient is in need of hospitalization. 30 6 The absence of a privilege
during an examination conducted pursuant to a court order may be
justified on the ground that, because the patient knows that the therapist is obliged to report to the court, he has no expectation of privacy. Theoretically, the patient may refuse to talk with the therapist
304. See Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 174-77 (1974).
For an excellent review of the steps a court might follow to avoid unnecessary conflicts
between the sixth amendment and various statutory privileges, see Note, Defendant v.
Witness: Measuring Confrontationand Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory
CommunicationsPrivileges, 30 STAN. L. REV. 935, 985-90 (1978). Courts might engage a
similar procedure in cases in which the right of privacy may be subject to sixth amendment limitations.
305. See, e.g, United States v. Yates, 524 F.2d 1282, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense
Witnesses,91 HARv. L. REV. 1266, 1271-73 (1978); Note, "The Public Has a Claim to Every
Man'sEvidence". The Defendant's ConstitutionalRight to Witness Immunity, 30 STAn.
L. REV. 1211, 1221-30 (1978); Comment, Right of the Criminal Defendant to the Compelled Testimony of Witnesses, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 953, 976 (1967); Comment, A Re-Examination of Defense Witness Immunity: A New Use for Kastigar, 10 HARv. J. LEGIs.
74, 87 (1972).
306. See Proposed Rules of Evidence, Rule 504(d) (1), reprintedin 56 F.R.D. 183,241
(1972); FIA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503(4) (a) (West 1979).
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or at least to reveal intensely personal information. The voluntariness of this kind of waiver is difficult to accept, however, because patients may be committed or jailed if they refuse to talk with the
therapist. 30 7 In addition, some commentators have suggested that, in
examinations related to involuntary civil commitment, patients
have a right to refuse, without penalty,
should be informed that30they
8
to talk with a therapist.
Providing a general exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in civil commitment proceedings (or when the patient is in need
of hospitalization) is unnecessary. Information regarding a patient's
mental condition or dangerousness can almost always be obtained by
court ordered examinations, which are not subject to the privilege.
30 9
Because a person must generally be dangerous to be committed,
the dangerousness exception to the privilege would often permit the
disclosure of information concerning therapy when necessary to prevent the release of a dangerous patient.
Other Exceptions
Other exceptions to statutory psychotherapist-patient privileges may
include provisions terminating the privilege upon the death of the
holder of the privilege 3 10 or excluding from the privilege information
relating to incidents of child abuse discovered during therapy.3 11 In
the case of a common law or statutory privilege, these kinds of exceptions may be based either on the assumption that the harm to the
therapist-patient relationship is minimal when the breach of certain
kinds of confidentiality is allowed (e.g., breach after the patient's
death), or that the harm to the relationship if confidentiality is
breached is not as great as the potential harm to others if the information is kept secret (e.g., in child abuse cases). In a constitutionally based privilege, these exceptions could be based on a compelling
307. See notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text (discussing the efforts of California courts to deal with similar problems).
308. See Aronson, Should the Privilege Against Self-incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examination?,26 STAN. L. R.v. 55, 70-71 (1973); Fielding, Compulsory Psychiatric Examination in Civil Commitment and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 9 GONZ. L. REv. 117, 154-64 (1973); Comment, Application of the Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incriminationto the Civil Commitment Proceeding,
1973 DuKE L.J. 729, 745-46. But see Orland, Evidence in PsychiatricSettings, 11 GoNz. L.
REv. 665, 684-86 (1976).
309. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76 (1975). In general, a person
may be involuntarily committed in a civil proceeding if, because of a mental illness, he
is dangerous to himself or others. The state interest in restraining these dangerous
people is sufficiently strong to allow their incarceration. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 731-39 (1972). Consequently, the restraint on liberty resulting from the absence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege in commitment proceedings is not likely to
be viewed as an impermissible invasion of privacy.
310. See, e.g., Proposed Rules of Evidence, Rule 504(d) (3), reprinted in 56 F.R.D.
183, 241 (1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503(4) (c) (West 1979).
311. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(7) (Baldwin 1980). See generally Brown, Child
Abuse: Attempts to Solve the Problem by Reporting Laws, 60 WOMEN LAW. J. 73 (1974);
Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature,8 FAm. LQ. 245 (1974);
Note, Better Protectionfor the Defenseless - Tennesee's Revised Mandatory Child
Abuse Reporting Statute, 4 MEM. ST. U. L REv. 585 (1974). For an interesting examination of the civil consequences of the failure to report child abuse, see Kohlman, Malpractice Liabilityfor Failing to Report Child Abuse, 49 CAT_ ST. B.J. 118 (1974).
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state interest (e.g., prevention of child abuse), or on the claim that
the right of privacy is not violated at all by the disclosure (e.g., loss of
the privilege at death).
The state's interest in having information regarding child abuse is
similar to the state's interest in a dangerous future crime exception
to the privilege. Protecting children from serious harm is undoubtedly a state interest "of the highest order" and under some conditions would constitute permissible grounds to interfere with a
patient's right of privacy in therapy. Broad child abuse reporting
statutes, pursuant to which a therapist would be required to report
any child abuse discovered during therapy, however, provide for
more than a narrow interference with the constitutional right of privacy. As with a future dangerous crime exception, it is questionable
whether a state rule requiring that therapists breach the confidentiality of therapy to report child abuse would actually advance the state's
interest in preventing future child abuse. The threat of a breach of
confidentiality might keep some child abusers from seeking the therapy they need, or might induce them, once in therapy, to keep information regarding child abuse from the therapist. Indeed, patients
would probably conceal incidents of child abuse from therapists if
they knew that the therapist would report their discussions to the
state. By requiring therapists to breach the confidences of patients,
therefore, the state would discourage child abusers from seeking effective psychotherapy to deal with the problems that cause them to
abuse their children. To the extent that the state interest is not significantly promoted by laws requiring therapists to report all incidents of child abuse discovered during therapy, the compelling state
interest doctrine would not justify an invasion of the privacy of
patients.

VII. Conclusion
The recognition of the right of privacy is an important constitutional
development. Courts have been faced with such a vast array of privacy claims, however, that privacy at times seems to be unworkable
as a constitutional concept. Indeed, the absence of general principles
to guide judicial application of the constitutional right of privacy may
ultimately threaten its very existence. The analytical framework
presented by this article for the application of the rights of information privacy and autonomy privacy defines the general principles underlying the concept of a constitutional right of privacy. Applied in
the context of psychotherapy, these principles afford protection to
the confidential communications of patients. The confidences revealed in psychotherapy are likely to include the most personal
thoughts, feelings, and aspects of one's life. Government compelled
disclosure of this most personal information is offensive, particularly
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when the compelled disclosure is public, as in a trial. Mental illness,
moreover, may be as protracted, painful and disruptive as is an unwanted pregnancy. Governmental action that significantly interferes
with the treatment of mental illness, therefore, infringes on the right
of privacy. At least some evidence indicates that threats to the confidentiality of therapy significantly interfere with successful therapy.
Although a privilege fashioned out of constitutional principles of privacy would not necessarily be absolute, it would assure patients of
protection in all but the most narrow and compelling circumstances.
Successful psychotherapy advances the interests of both individual patients and society. Because successful therapy depends upon
confidentiality between patient and psychotherapist, the protection
of individual and societal interests requires the recognition of a principle that will surround the communications of therapy with a nearly
impenetrable veil. The attempt to afford protection through statutory
privileges, however, has been a "misguided hope"; most statutory
privileges are diluted by numerous exceptions, which often effectively destroy the privilege. Legislatures and courts should provide
an exception only for the most extraordinary reasons, and even then,
should strictly limit disclosure only to information that is not available from another source.
Constitutional protection for the confidences of therapy will have a
considerable impact on persons beyond those who actually invoke a
privilege. Few patients will need to invoke the privilege to prevent
the disclosure of information regarding therapy. Knowledge that the
privilege is available, however, will protect all psychotherapy patients, who will know that they can be fully open and honest in
therapy.
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